"It is because I am what I am, objectionable though that appears to my critics, that I win battles."

I've mentioned, on this blog, a couple of my favorite unconventional warriors: COL David Smiley and TE Lawrence. But no one stands at the confluence of personal eccentricity and military genius like Orde Wingate.
Chaim Herzog, Israel's first Prime Minister, described him as "my favorite madman." As a British Intelligence Officer in Palestine in the late 1930's, he organized and led the Haganah Night Squads on deep strike missions against the fedayeen, adopting and adapting the Arab raiders' own tactics to use against them.
In Ethiopia (Abyssinia, at the time), Wingate formed the Gideon Force and led Ethiopian troops to their victory over the Italians in the early '40s. He put Haile Selassie (Ras Tafari, to you Bob Marley fans) back on the thrown. Having routed the Italians, he was ordered to stop short of entering Addis Abbaba with his indig forces; apparently British High Command was worried that his dusky warriors would celebrate their victory by raping all the white women in the ville. Wingate knew the symbolic importance of Salassie's taking the city and getting back on the thrown himself, so he asked his counterpart for his word that he wouldn't molest the ladies, it was granted, and Haile Selassie victoriously re-took Addis Abbaba.
Not long after his Italian campaign, Wingate had a total nervous breakdown and was institutionalized. He made a nominal recovery, and began trying to market an irregular warfare strategy for blocking the Japanese from reaching India with an unconventional combined force. Winston Churchill liked Wingate and his ideas and took him to meet Roosevelt on one of their secret rendezvous. Roosevelt saw the value of Wingate's plans and the two titular heads of the Western Allies turned him loose on Burma. Wingate organized and trained the Chindit force, and died in Burma.

"Wingate saw himself as a boot up the backside of Man. The fact that most of his ideas ran directly against those of his superiors did not worry him in the slightest."
(Arthur Swinson)

Wingate's critics found him objectionable not only because of his commando-centric opinions of the waging of war, but also because of his personal eccentricities. During the after action debriefs of his Night Raid detachment in Palestine, he could often be found sitting on a camp stool in the corner of the command tent, naked, reading a Bible and munching on a raw onion. Officers that interviewed with him to serve with the Chindits in Burma entered his tent to find him naked on a cot, grooming his body hair with a tooth brush. They also documented that for physical training, he made the entire unit practice yoga (the guy was obviously a deviant).
It was in Burma that Wingate perfected the tactic of having his light, mostly indigenous forces execute deep penetrations behind Japanese lines, and then used his Allied air power to drop in the heavy weapons he needed to defeat the Japanese. This tactic was copied with great success by the OSS' Detachment 101.
Wingate is the archetype for letting a possible goofball run rampant in a military organization. Studying his campaigns and the maturation of his concepts of unconventional warfare is about as much fun as a student of military history is going to get. I apologize if this post isn't as detailed as one dedicated to Wingate should be; I don't have my stash of Wingate references to hand. Most of what's written here is pulled from memory from a Wingate article in No End Save Victory (which by the way, is an eclectic compilaiton of essays from notable historians on their favorite aspects of and vignettes from WWII with a slight tilt towards favoring Special Operations; this is one of those books that makes you smarter)
Many thanks to Bubby, who took a time out from his arduous PhD studies to find me the link above to a decent Wingate site on the web.

The Things Worth Believing In

Synergy? or Attenuation?

Interesting stuff.

"Friendly competition" amongst our bureaucracies has such a great track record. Right?

Whether you admired his entrepreneurship or thought he was "bad for the sport," Charles "Mask" Lewis did a lot to promote MMA and helped carve a distinctive niche in our culture for fighters.
Mask was killed yesterday in a car accident in California.
Like a lot of Martial Artists, I was a little ambivalent about the Tapout line of clothing and work-out gear. The Tapout crew is loud, brash and often obnoxious. But, their clothes are frikkin' cool and there's something to be said about demonstrating excess in a sport that you love. Even though it wasn't for me, I ended up liking their attitude and refusal to tone down.
In a perfect coda, Lewis died speeding in his $300K Ferrari, with a hot chick at his side. (She survived, thankfully)

Mosul

This article gets it about right. Mosul isn't a happy place.

Never Waste an R&R

As usual, Mungadai are exceeding the standard. 19KiloJoe is winning hearts and minds...sort of.

Deemed Acceptable

Okay, if you've just absolutely positively got to be a tree-hugging, placard carrying peacenik, at least you can be hot and do it nekkid.
Wish I had been there; I hear Asuncion is beautiful this time of year...

Small Victories

Great post by the World's Strongest Librarian, Josh Hanagarne. An object demonstration of how will and self-discipline can, over the long term and by small increments, work miracles.
I think more and more, our society is trending toward actually encouraging individuals to assume victim status, to give up, and to passively accept that they've been wronged, abused, or ignored by forces beyond their control.
Josh Hanagarne refused to surrender and fought his way through to a truly impressive set of accomplishments. Step by step, one small victory at a time.
Good for him.

And Speaking of Colombia

As I wrote about Colombia, and it's refusal to give quarter to the FARC over the years of in-earnest counterinsurgency, I should've mentioned last July's daring hostage rescue.
This is one that will go down in the Special Operations history books. It is a great exemplar of the type of will that President Uribe and the Colombian people have exerted in their efforts to maintain a free and democratic Colombia.

COIN Tourism

This article recommends that Iraq follow Colombia's example and, if I read it right, incorporate tourism into its COIN strategy. Not sure that the author is being real coherent (make no mistake, it could well be me, little bit whacked & sleep deprived), but I think he's saying that Iraq should identify its most marketable tourist destinations, focus security improvements there, and then use the resulting burgeoning tourist industry to pump in hard currency and solidify stabilization gains.
That doesn't sound quite right. Maybe it's better to use tourism as a metric of COIN success, but one has to be pretty careful; premature opening of a tourist site could have catastrophic negative consequences if the jihadis get a vote. I added my two-cents on Iraqi tourism earlier.
But to limit the use of the Colombian example to just tourism is selling short the lessons that can be gained from studying COIN in Colombia. In many ways, Colombia is the textbook case for counterinsurgency. The FARC is on the ropes, the ELN is almost a non-player anymore.
Alvaro Uribe is a truly heroic politician, much as that term has become an oxymoron most of the world over. His refusal to negotiate with or offer appeasement to the FARC has been one of the keys to victory. To demonstrate how far Colombia has come: on the day Uribe's predecessor, Pastrana, left office, the ELN mortared the Presidential residence, just because they could and to say "thanks for the memories, fuck you." Now, Colombia is being touted as a tourism hotspot.
Full Disclosure: I am pretty much a Colombophile, and love the place. I'd move the whole famn damily there lock, stock and barrel if the Army ever offered me the chance. Of course, that would entail introducing Mongo's Wife (US, Primary, 1 each) to Mongo's Colombian wife. It would probably be a little awkward at first, but I think we could all work through it. Right, honey? Honey?

Oops

Well, that's a little inconvenient. They make the system look a little smoother on CSI.

IED/VBIED Laydown

This article argues that EID and VBIED are not decisive, either in Iraq or Afghanistan. No, they're not, but they are a constant pain in the ass, and we're still losing great soldiers to the enemy because of them.
One thing this article doesn't cover is the IO component of the EID/VBIED phenomenon. The author talks about triggermen, but we also look for cameramen every time one goes off. The jihadis get a lot of mileage on their websites from footage of IED/VBIED operations against coalition forces. Whether the IO value outweighs the costs and losses incurred by the jihadis is up to someone else to determine.
Still, the article well conveys how complex the IED networks and cells are here, and how it's hard to roll up a network decisively, instead of just putting the grab on a couple of muttonheads that can be replaced in short order.

It's A Start

Good. Now start wrapping the bodies in pigskin, and we might get some traction.
That's IO.

Building a Life of Note

Supposedly, everyone gets 15 minutes of fame; a select few achieve notoriety for centuries, for good or ill. But who consciously goes out and builds a life of note, one that may only get a footnote in history, but of which one can look back and say, "Yeah, I did that."
Colonel David Smiley built such a life. You've got to admire the guy's dedication, passion, and patriotism and his willingness to accept inordinate personal risk in pursuit of doing that which he knew to be right. The guy has a whole closet full of "been there" T-shirts.
Of note, to me as an eternal foe and observer of bureaucracies, is the fact that while his obituary is rife with intrepid acts of derring-do, it's also salted with occasional fuck ups. In today's Army (or working with today's government), I think that any one of these would be a career ender. The SAS, of which Smiley was a member, declares that "who dares, wins." But it can also be said that "who dares, will every now and then biff." What is needed today is not, I think, men of steel like Smiley so much as organizations willing to employ them and underwrite their mistakes, knowing that no one is perfect and plans oft go awry.
Success is an obit that states: "Smiley's exploits led some to suggest that he was, along with several other candidates, a model for James Bond." I mean, how fucking cool is that?

h/t to Buddha, for passing me the obituary.

A Look at Lawrence

Young CPT Burke has posted a pretty good look at TE Lawrence through the lens of "what individual characteristics did Lawrence possess that made him so good that we should strive to replicate in today's counterinsurgents?" over at the Small Wars Journal.
I enjoyed Burke's article, and as usual will pick at it to tease out those few things that I disagree with IOT refine my own thinking. First up, Burke describes Lawrence's attributes as those required of the counterinsurgent, but Lawrence didn't fight a counterinsurgency; he spawned, fostered, and directed an insurgency. I'm not saying that those two different sides of the same coin (no pun intended) require different personal attributes and characteristics in order to succeed, but there should be a great deal of thought and analysis done before one concludes that this is, in fact, the case. One can look at Lawrence's success in occupying and pacifying Damascus as appropriate and declare that his actions prevented a reactionary insurgency by the denizens of Damascus, and that this provides the necessary creds to declare him a counterinsurgent. I would submit that the counterinsurgent needs to be a bit more stayed, methodical, and deliberate than the insurgent. Over- or under-reacting to the insurgent's provocations can both lead to disasterous results for the counterinsurgent. The insurgent, on the other hand, doesn't need to win so much as demonstrate that the established government is losing and incapable of winning. The insurgent can also put his more risky courses of action into the hands of fronts and splinter groups that will allow him to pursue his aims of delegitimizing the state without having to take responsibility for any operations or endeavors that go wrong. The counterinsurgent, necessarily tied to the state and its elements of power, will be tagged with any counterinsurgency failures--even those in which the narrative is false. I don't know if these differences mandate different personality types in the individuals responsible for formulation and execution of the respective campaigns. A quick and easy (and therefore flawed but adequate) analogy is that the insurgent is the Destroyer, the counterinsurgent is the Builder. The differences in effort and resources required of one over the other are intuitive. Does the personality of those executing the strategy need to also be so bifurcated?
Another theme of Burke's paper that needs to be parsed is his declaration that all Armies (Great War British Army, post-Cold War US Army) suffer bouts of anti-intellectualism. I don't think that this is quite accurate. I would posit that, at least in the case of the US Army, we've never been anti-intellectual--but we have been anti-academic, with some justification. I can imagine--and to an extent agree with--the CDR who looks at one of his young studs, and demures sending him to advanced academic study after looking at our institutions of higher learning, thinking to himself, what good comes of my turning over this stud to a bunch of long-haired, maggot infested, patchuli-smelling, dope smoking, Birckenstock-wearing, tree hugging, close minded examples of arrogance embodied? Anyone who thinks that Army officers can be egomaniacal, inflexible, and overconfident should rub elbows with the upper crust academics for a little while. I commented on the value of advanced learning for Army officers here, and I stick to that. Also, in my (long and storied) career in the military, the officer corps has always been manifestly eager to produce Rennaissance men, I guess what Burke calls pentathletes. And I think that this has been to the Army's detriment, because in typical Army fashion, the first thing we do is 'gin up a list of everything we think a Rennaissance man should know, have read, and have done, and then we steadfastly pursue ensuring that our officers get this checklist jammed down their throats, and we end up with guys that have wave-top knowledge of a lot of different subjects, many of which the guys have no passion for.
Were I to decide I needed in-depth analysis and assessment of a possible future geopolitical hotspot, and had to choose a military professional or an academic to go in, walk the ground, and render the product, I'd choose the military guy every time. In fact, I've spent a significant portion of my career getting sent to various far-flung shitholes to do just that, and have then had to come back, brief, and generate product for military, academic, and political audiences. As an aside, what I found was that I really like shitholes, with the glaring exception of Haiti.
Academic credentialing aside, Burke also seems to imply that we should seek out our military misfits IOT exploit their unique individuality and operational perspective. Lawrence, apparently, was a long-haired, slovenly dresser whose lack of regard for organizational standards of appearence (and his disdain for those who hewed to them) put him at odds with his chain of command. I'm a little torn commenting on this, since as an eternal foe of bureacracies, I'm loath to find myself defending bureacracies. But, maybe we've got it just right. Maybe if one wants to be different, one must be better, an exceptional performer whose exploits compensate for the lack of professional comportment. Also, truly brilliant operators are smart enough to evaluate their operational environment and modify their appearance so that aesthetics alone don't derail the mission. What I get from Burke's treatise is that Lawrence was smart enough to walk into a meeting with Sheiks and Mukhtars dressed in Arab robes, but he wasn't smart enough to look sharp when he reported to his commanding officer. Hmm. And I'm offering this criticism as a guy who is generally long haired and slovenly.
The military, as a bureaucracy and as a human organization, will be to some extent sloppy and inefficient when it polices itself, but police itself it must. For every TE Lawrence, Ord Wingate, orDavid Smiley, there are five thugs, three proponents of waste, fraud and abuse, two sexual perverts and a guy who resembles "Pyle" from Full Metal Jacket. Maybe miscreants, oddballs, and non-conformists need to be held at arms length until they establish beyond a reasonable doubt that they will do more good than harm. I think, more important than matriculating and empowering our TE Lawrences, is training and cultivating our Edmund Allenby's, leaders who can put the right guy in the right place and at the right time, and aim and constrain them so that their individuality and niche brilliance enhances organizational success.
I wonder how effective Lawrence would have been without Allenby there to empower him--and without the conventional forces that Allenby could use in tandem with Lawrence's desert raiders to effect a campaign of compound warfare, a fatal knot that defeated the Turks. I wouldn't mind seeing an analysis of the one-two combinations that Lawrence's unconventional and Allenby's conventional capabilities generated in the desert campaign. Of course, I'll have to wait for someone like Burke to write it, cause I'm long-haired, slovenly, and lazy.

Quote of the Day

From Cormac McCarthy's "All the Pretty Horses":

...I was also rebellious and so I recognize it in others. Yet I think that I had no wish to break things. Or perhaps only those things that wished to break me. The names of the entities that have power to constrain us change with time. Convention and authority are replaced by infirmity.

With the Fellas

Some days feel like a Soprano's family reunion.

Another Day at the Office, II

The Face of Evil

A sobering quartet of articles illustrate a point that is too often diluted by attempts at rationalization and explication instead of residing where it ought: in the visceral. Because we haven't been hit again since 9/11, we don't regard the War on Terror as an existential battle. And it's not--for us. But our Islamist opponents have dedicated themselves body, mind, and soul to our destruction.

It is a construct of our civilized, generally secular modernism that no one man can be judge, jury, and executioner. We also strive mightily to provide due process for the worst members of our society. But, the Islamists aren't from our society. Ralph Peters provides an interesting intellectual exercise: Let's suppose that each nation-state is a different planet. Instead of assuming a common humanity, let's regard these extraterrestrials totally objectively, and then decide on the best course of action on how to deal with them.

We are facing pure, unadulterated evil. This is hard to grasp, especially when the ideology of the evildoers ostensibly issues from the religion of peace. I think most of us born and bred in the secular, modern west have a hard time grasping the concept of evil. And, too, it's hard to stand up against evil in our modern times without sounding like someone indulging in self-righteous bigotry or xenophobia. Part of the problem is our lexicon. What's the opposite of evil? Good? Good vs. bad, we get. Good vs. evil? The problem with "good" is that good isn't perfect. So if we're generally good, but with the fundamental flaws that come with the human condition, aren't our enemies? Isn't it possible that we misunderstand their words? Don't they want to find a negotiated peace where we can celebrate the "goodness" we have in common while we all work together to fix our flaws? Plus, if we're not perfect, then who are we to judge? Aren't our enemies just like us, just forced into terrorism as a tactic because of their fundamental inability to peaceably reconcile their differences with us?

No. They are evil. They revel in it. They are not human beings as we understand the word. Despite all the atrocities we've seen spooled across the news, this is still a hard concept to grasp, because our opponents desires and motivations are so alien.

Judea Pearl's son Daniel was brutally, horrifically murdered. He has seen, to his dismay, our society "define deviancy down" when it comes to terrorism. And he warns that we fail to identify evil as what it is at our own physical and moral peril.

Another Day at the Office

Shacked up by one of our brothers on Team Spitfire. Totally apt.

I'm Not Proud, But...

...I'm thinkin' that, were it me, I'd pretty much keep this under wraps.

1. Sorry about the whole "depression" thing, Fifi, now sit and stay while I go get my shotgun.

2. The Dog Breed encyclopedia says that the standard poodle can get up to 80 pounds, so maybe Fifi is getting a bad wrap as an absurb French lapdog; apparently a "real" (standard) French Poodle can kick some ass when it wants to.

Oops, 80-pound poodle Fifi is not. Instead Fifi is a Maltese Bichon. You can see Cujo's little cousin here. "Mauled" is a physically impossible descriptor.

Like I said, I'd've kept this one out of the papers & made up a story about a Grizzly Bear or something.

Functionality as Art

When form follows function, what would otherwise be an ugly, bronze-plated buffalo chip becomes an invaluable piece of art. And thus it is with the Air Force's A-10 Warthog.
This story narrates how, as the A-10 fleet is upgraded, the F-16 is viewed as an acceptable "replacement platform" for ground support. The F-16 is a beautiful machine, flying at something like Mach-73 while it destroys everything in sight. But I'm not sure it can truly "replace" the Warthog.
The Warthog is an ugly machine, but it was designed specifically to provide support to troops on the ground. It comes in low and slow, and there are few sights as beautiful as an A-10 "shaking off the dirt" as it lines up for a gun run. The pilot sees what you see, and has the time to "dialogue" with you to ensure that he's firing up the right target and not, say, you. The F-16 can't replicate that; it flashes by at 400+ mph and if the pilot blinks, he'll miss the show. Plus, the A-10 is a hardy vehicle. Because its speed makes it a target to the ground forces it's engaging, the pilot sits in basically a titanium bathtub, so he can trade punches as he comes in to line up his 30mm thundersticks. The F-16s speed is its security, and so it probably wouldn't move any slower even if it could.
So the F-16 is the blow-dried pretty boy, employing all the latest gizmos and gadgets to get the job done with style and aplomb, while the A-10 is cauliflower-eared, scarred-knuckle brawler who believes that any mission can be accomplished with the liberal application of brute force and ignorance.
The A-10 Warthog, a work of art.

And Speaking of "Warrior Intellectuals"

Can't wait to see how this works out. A philosopher-cum-government minister is re-designing the Brazilian military. I don't want to sound like a pessimist, but I'm thinking the Brazilian military will come out the worse for the deal.
I had a chance to visit the Brazilian SOF Brigade a couple of years ago. Outstanding unit, outstanding troops. The Brazilian SOF Brigade is located near the city of Goiania (sorry, my keyboard is not set up for using all those Portuguese soupcons) and is comprised of a commando battalion (think ranger battalion), a special forces battalion, two support battalions, and civil affairs and PSYOPs detachments.
Since Brazil has nothing akin to our Posse Comitatus Act, and since the Brazilian constitution charges the armed forces to "help maintain the rule of law," the Brazilian military (especially the SOF) sees a lot of action on the interior. The linked article above notes that the Brazilians have had remarkable success running the military arm of the UN relief effort in Haiti. That's because the (SOF) Brazilian commander promptly adopted a policy of "badass-itude" and the usual cast of Haitian ne'er-do-wells got the message that they could, not to put too fine a point on it, shape up or die.
One of the things that impressed me about the Brazilian SOF is that their company grade officers have four basic responsibilities: Training their men, doing PT, reading, and writing. In Goiania, I had a better discussion with these young officers about Bob Woodward's book The Commanders and how it reflects US policy formulation than I did at the US Army Command and Staff College. These guys are sharp, they've built a sharp organization, and it'd be a shame to see someone muck it up.
Still, if Mr. Philosophy Guy is the right guy, Brazil could win in the long term. Brazil views itself (rightfully so, in my opinion) as an up-and-coming Superpower, and configuring the Armed Forces to grow with Brazilian influence and interests will be a key to its success. The limited view of the Brazilian military that I saw revealed an organization that knew exactly how it needed to grow and reform in order to maintain relevance. The only question is whether Mr. Unger is smart enough to listen to them.

A Degree and $1.47 Will Get You a Cup of Coffee

This notable article in the Small Wars Journal, Courageous Colonels, prompted this blog post, Warrior Intellectuals, by a young Air Force Captain.
A couple of quick thoughts on both.
First, leave it to an Air Force guy to 'gin up a blog called "Building Peace." Curtis LeMay is rolling over in his grave right now. Peace is having your enemies capitulate to your will and your competitors prudently avoiding confrontations.
Second, I would be very, very careful in proclaiming that the Army (or really any of our military departments) is now a learning organization. It's not; it's a bureaucracy. And like any bureaucracy, it's hallmarks are stratification, ossification, resistance to change, and risk aversion. Anyone thinking that we've reached an age of enlightened reason and intellectual exchange is in for a harsh awakening. We in the Army are, at best, a marginally effective bureaucracy.
The reason we are effective is because we train young officers for the first two to four years of their budding careers that mission failure is unacceptable because their nation's defense and interests, and their soldier's lives, are at stake. Then we pull them away from troops and have them toil for years as "staff officers"--i.e., mid-level bureaucrats. They bring this sense of mission with them when they are sent to the salt mines.
Few people are more pro-Army than I, and here is my considered opinion:
Our Army doesn't win because we are so great, our Army wins because it is less fucked up than everybody else's.
The fact that the Army adapted its strategy is as much a product of successful bureaucratic infighting and luck as it is the intellectual prowess of the officers who identified and matriculated the new strategy. Don't get me wrong, I'm not in any way downplaying the importance of nor denigrating the need for their intellectual firepower. I'm just saying that in a bureaucracy, talent and ability are just one (small) component of success.

Finally, I'm a little ambivalent about the whole "warrior intellectual" meme. I think that we need to discriminate first between intellectuals and Soldiers holding advanced degrees. [NOTE: I'm speaking in general here, and I'm definitely NOT decrying the cerebral proficiency of any of the "Courageous Colonels." Case in point: John Nagl is a true blue fifty-pound brain. In a battle of brains he'd have me tapping fast and hard. Battle of brawn, not so much. Heh] Most professional military officers have the grey-matter wherewithal to earn an advanced degree, it's the opportunity to do so that is elusive.
I think that the most valuable facet of an advanced degree (read PhD) is that it credentials one for partaking in the dialogue outside of the Army. Oh, he's got a PhD? He must know what he's talking about. That other schmuck over there? Knuckledragger. If there is a delinquency that time provided for the acquisition of an advanced degree ameliorates, it's the use of the time to slow down, read, and then to kick back in the chair, feet on the desk & hands behind the head, and actually think. Process rather than product. I've had a couple of academic types tell me that the importance of the PhD is not that the knowledge gained is exclusive to a doctorate, but because getting the doctorate shows the discipline to apply the knowledge to a process that leads to the degree. Really? Y'know what active duty officers sent exclusively to study for a degree call the process? Down time.

More Bunk

Fox news is proclaiming that not only are we Americans all getting fatter, but now the percentage of obese Americans is greater than the percentage of overweight Americans.

This is crap.

The article relies on the sample population being measured according to the Body Mass Index, or BMI, which is fundamentally unsound. The BMI is a strict height-weight ratio, so percentage of body fat vice muscle mass is not accounted for. Nor is ratio of waist-to-neck (which is what the Army uses). Nor is any other assessment tool used to discriminate as to whether you're a stud or a lardass.

So if one posits that muscle weighs more than fat, the aggregate numbers of any given population will be skewed towards being too heavy. In fact, one could reasonably hypothesize that, were the American population to suffer one of its periodic throes of fitness mania, similar studies would indicate that we are getting fatter and more out of shape because people were shedding fat and putting on heavier muscle.

I get the ass at these types of articles because 1) they're bad science, and 2) they're calling me fat. Actually, I found a BMI calculater on the 'net and determined that I'm obese.

I'm not going to generate a vanity-based laundry list of my fitness bona fides; let's just say that the mesomorphic mass of twisted steel and sex appeal that is Mongo is not obese.

I'm a Super-Predator, dammit.

Super Cool

Hey, baby, I'm not just a predator--I'm a super predator...

About five minutes of analysis is enough to convince one that this article is bunk. Show me the numbers, show me the methodology used to assess these numbers, and I might come close to almost possibly thinking that it could be the result of sound employment of the scientific method. But I doubt it.

This is one of those fanciful opinions wrapped in pseudo-science. Still, it says super-predator, which is cool.

Ace of Spades Concurs

Looks like Gabriel Malor won't be sending his kid to Hastings College of Law, either. I think he got the description of Prof Bisharat right in the title of his post.
On the article itself:

This was the best they could come up with? Somebody gets the bright idea to present the Hamas side of things, but the best op ed they got was from Professor Laughingstock who had to make up his own facts and his own law? Sheesh. You're entitled to your opinion, but not your own facts, Doc.

Sorry, kid, I want you to get a real law degree...

Can you imagine being a hard-working parent who is not looking for a handout--I mean a bail out--who scrimps, saves, sacrifices, and takes out loans up the yinyang (that, something new and different, you fully intend to repay on schedule) in order to help your kid achieve his dream of getting his law degree, and opening up the newspaper to find that one of the kid's professors had written this piece of excrement? I'd be a wee bit disheartened.

I'm not a lawyer (al'humdulelah), nor am I recognized expert in military law. But I am the guy who goes to jail if I make a fundamentally unsound decision on the battlefield, so I know a little bit. I apparently know way, way more than Professor Bisharat. This essay is so unbelievably wrong, it is hard to critique. It has its facts wrong, is has its history wrong, and it has its interpretation of the Law of War wrong. Other than that, I guess it's not too bad.

If one follows the article to its logical conclusion, then almost any act of war constitutes a war crime. Parents busting hump to get Junior through the Hastings College of Law in San Francisco must be so proud. It's okay to be anti-war and/or anti-Israel, but at least make your arguments honest. I've got to wonder if this guy wrote the essay in crayon on that big-lined paper with the dashed line down the middle.

Next up, Law of War fingerpainting!

Good Enough for the Bad Guys, Apparently

I was going to write a series of posts on the Mumbai atrocities and haven't gotten around to it (not making effective use of my copious amounts of leisure time). However, this article offered some perspective on one of my yet-to-be-written posts.

Apparently, the ol' faithful Lee-Enfield is making a come-back amongst the Taliban. This was the WWI-era weapon that was disparaged by Indian authorities trying to justify why their police in Mumbai were too scared--I mean outgunned--to actually try to, you know, protect and serve.

There is nothing wrong with a bolt action rifle. The shooter has a much better chance of winning an engagement at any type of distance against someone with an AK that's on full auto. The bullet will put a man down hard, even if the shot doesn't hit a lethal area of the target. The "outgunned" excuse is one of the most pathetic rationalizations I've seen for police inaction in Mumbai.

Concur

I totally, thoroughly, enthusiastically agree with this.

Ashura

Yesterday was Ashura, the 10th day of Muharram. This is an optional day of fasting for Sunnis. For Shi'i, though, Ashura commemorates the massacre of Husayn ibn Ali on the plains of Karbala in 680 AD. Husayn was Mohammed's grandson, and his martyrdom denotes the formal schism in Islam between Sunnis and Shi'i.

I've seen on the news, as have many Americans, the spectacle of Shi'i beating themselves on the heads with stones or scourging their backs with chains on Ashura, but I've never been in the company of Shi'i during Ashura.

Our counterpart unit is 80-90% Shi'a. Groups of policemen were quietly gathered around the compound, listening to services on radios. The limited number of TVs in offices in the compound were also tuned to Ashure commemorations.

In the Commander's office, the CDR and some of his senior officers were watching an Ashura service on TV. When I came in, all of them had red-rimmed eyes and were all clutching and using copious amounts of Kleenex. As the service progressed, the emotions of both the people in the office and the crowd on TV grew more and more intense. Ashura services consist primarily of reading the epic of the martyrdom of Husayn and the massacre of his family. At the part of the recitation where Husayn dies, the Imam choked up and couldn't go on. The crowd (real and virtual) was sobbing.

When I've noted Ashura before, on TV, the grief of the congregations or crowds always seemed melodramatic to the point of absurdity. It must, I thought, be a put-on. Now I've definitely got a different opinion. The emotional anguish of the Shi'i on Ashura is as real as it gets. These people were in agony. I've seen people that have lost family members the day before (or even that day) to terrorism or criminality that weren't as grief-stricken as my brothers in the office.

Imagine Christmas, Easter, and Thanksgiving all roled into one. Conjure your warmest Christmas memory, slipping down the stairs in your footie pajamas to recon the treasures under the tree on Christmas morning before waking up Mom and Dad. Now invert all those feelings and imagine a day that evokes rage, grief and betrayal and is as formulative and evocative as those Christmas memories.

These guys aren't emotional pushovers, either. The day before yesterday, my counterpart unit was hit with a complex VBIED attack. The cement truck bearing the IED was vaporized. Some of the Shurta (police) were scuffed up and had some minor wounds. Because the VBIED "charged" the third vehicle in the formation, it's a safe assumption that the attack was targeting the CDR. That didn't even cause a blip on his emotional radar.

Needless to say, I felt more than a little awkward. I don't think an American, with a worldview focused on the future, not the past, can commiserate. *

And, after awhile I thought about a religion that could hold on to its unsettled scores this dearly. And how Iran, now developing nuclear weapons, is overwhelmingly Shi'a.

*Got it, there are Shi'i Americans who probably suffer horribly on Ashura. Not what I'm saying. Don't be so literal.

Black Belt Magazine Meditations

Rolled through the PX today (looking for Copenhagen, of which there was none; go figure) and picked up the new issue of Black Belt Magazine. Lyoto Machida is on the cover, so I’m looking forward to reading the article on him. Machida is a joy to watch, as he employs his classical karate in the MMA game. His kicks are surgical in their precision, and his strategic skills match his tactical ability. He demonstrates the best fusion today of classical martial arts and mixed martial arts.

By design or accident, the “mailbox section” of the magazine (the only part I’ve had the chance to read) is chock-full of the usual debates between classicists and MMA enthusiasts. I think this is one of those unwinnable debates, as you’ll never be able to have all the debaters divest themselves of their personal prejudices and preferences in order to look at the evidence objectively. Each side seizes on those pieces of evidence that reinforce its own point of view, while casually disregarding (often substantive) claims on the other side.

MMA enthusiasts argue that Mixed Martial Arts competitions are the “real deal,” and that they are as close a simulation of real combat as one can get. Yuh, I frequently find myself “really” fighting sweaty, spandex-clad gloved opponents in the real world. Happens all the time. I think though, that it is a good point that one should cross-train enough to have at least some baseline capability at all ranges of the fight. Few classical systems bequeath the practitioner skills that are applicable across the entire spectrum of personal combat. You Tube is replete with examples of the Gracies getting classicists out of their usual engagement area and then demolishing them. A good parallel to combat sports is no shit combat: I expect the Mungadai to be proficient with every weapon system on the team. We train with crew-served weapons, carbines, and side arms at every opportunity, because the Mungadai need to be able to employ whichever system is best suited to accomplishing the mission—and it is frequently the enemy who engages at a time and place of his choosing. I think the MMA paradigm is a great template for cross-training, but would caution its advocates who think that it is the comprehensive “real deal.” The gloves, the lack of significant clothing (or equipment), and the competition rules all impose an artificiality that can be dangerous to the practitioner who thinks that he has an all-encompassing capability because of his MMA training.

The classicists argue that MMA training produces a thugocracy of ground’n’pounders who are jacks of all trades, masters of none. There is some validity to this argument, that the MMA guys have the exact opposite problem of one-dimensional classicists. Also, when viewing classic martial arts, one should realize that part of the reason that they are valuable is because they are old. Back in the old days, when “Bob” figured out that he had invented a groovy new technique (or a groovy new way to apply said technique) to try in the next battle, there was a pretty objective means of assessing the efficacy of Bob’s new toy. If Bob didn’t come back, one could reasonably assume that his theory was (fatally) flawed. [Note: this illustration using Bob was blatantly lifted from a lecture by Hanshi Ron Donvito] Also, classical martial arts instruction will usually include, as a healthy aside, values instruction. I’ve yet to walk into a classical dojo and not see Black Belt Principles prominently displayed on the walls somewhere. While not uniform, these principles help accomplish three objectives. First, they provide the student with a template that will help them mentally and emotionally conquer their physical limitations. Second, they provide values to someone receiving (possibly lethal) combat skills. Finally, “martial” arts are combat systems, originally intended for military use. Martial arts principles help individual students integrate into military organizations (which, when you think about it, also help today’s students integrate into society; good soldiers make good citizens). Even insurgent martial arts, such as Karate and Capoeira, were designed to allow individuals to contribute to group endeavors. Single-point classical systems work great for fighting and self defense—as long as the opponent uses the same system.

One recurring theme that I’ve seen (not just in BBM, but in a lot of classics vs MMA literature) is that classicists, particularly masters in the classic arts, don’t compete. I personally don’t agree with this philosophy, with caveats. Competition is probably the best skills assessment available to the martial artist. This is because the stress of competition replicates to a lesser degree the stress of combat. Dojo proficiency does not equal competition proficiency does not equal street proficiency. One finds ones skills attenuated in a competition environment. Suddenly, techniques and tactics one applies readily and with a great expectation of success in the dojo seem too risky for competition. That is because now the opponent is not a training partner, but a stranger who wants to defeat you and will exploit any weakness he can find. Your “game” necessarily constricts and becomes more conservative when you have to honestly assess your vulnerabilities against a determined opponent. Imagine how much more skill constriction takes place in an actual combat situation. If you cannot confidently employ a technique in competition, then you are not really good at it, and that particular skill is not fundamentally sound and reliable.

Also, competition helps to assess fitness. As you get older, it’s easy to become a legend in your own mind. Tough guys that have been there, done it, know that achieving most difficult goals is a matter of mental, vice physical, strength. However, substituting the attitude of “I’ve done it before, I can do it again, it’s all mental” is a siren song of disaster if one substitutes it for grueling workouts. At least in Judo/Jiu-Jitsu competition, the mats don’t lie. Fitness is a binary option. You either are, or you aren’t. A storied history of kicking ass and taking names, though, can seduce the warrior into self-deception. Just ‘cause you did it before don’t mean you can do it now. Nothing provides a safe means of self-assessment like competition.

The caveat mentioned above is for practitioners of lethal arts. Winning a no-holds-barred competition in, say, Kobushi Sesson Jitsu will earn you a nice little cell in death row. Also, the term martial artist is relative. Artsy artists span the gamut from Michelangelo to the crazy chick that smears her naked body in chocolate sauce and bean sprouts while screaming about the evils of the patrimony. Same concept. If your “martial art” was never intended to be applied to real or simulated (competition) violence, don’t compete. But don’t belittle those guys in the cage, either, Mr. “Artist.”

When Good MILFs Go Bad

So, who's up for some hot MILF action? Apparently, they're ugly and out of control.

Get your mind out of the gutter.

Rocks, Glass Houses, etc

Hmm. Could be awkward. Not that I've seen this fact curtail any finger pointing. I mean, after all...nope, stop typing now, Mongo, you're about to get political.

Well, I guess it's a...creative pick

As someone who could accurately be described as an end-user for intelligence (albeit right now in a very limited, very tactical sense), I found the selection of Leon Panetta to head up the CIA to be interesting. No intelligence background that I can find, although the guy is

a nine-term California congressman and accomplished deal-maker

so who knows, maybe he can squeeze more bang-for-the-buck out of those little blue pills. Heh.

COIN: So you want us to think "out of the box?"

How 'bout we help them get back into some box?

Aside from the little blue pills, note how all the "unconventional" items we're bribing with are things that these guys would get easy access to (schools, wells, medical care) if they'd just get with the program.

h/t llamabutcher

I've heard of Judicial Activisim; Is this Judicial Imperialism?

I said here that our system of handling detainees is insane.

I stand by my remarks.

Fool Me Once...

Okay, "fool" is probably inappropriate and makes light of a terrible situation.
At least she armed herself prior to round two.
Mongo Rule #1: If you don't have a gun, you're chum.

Come Discover Your Soul's Treasures

Yeah! No, really. Who'd've thought, they've got a travel agency for the totally fucking insane!
Tell you what, if this looks good to you, get a price quote from them. Then, for half of that, I'll kick you in the Jimmy, steal all your stuff, and burn whatever's left. And, I'll come to you, so that you don't have to put up with air fare and that pesky Iraqi customs search.
Extra points:
Um Al-Rabi'ain translates as "Mother of Two Springs" not "City of Two Springs."
Imagine searching the area in the first picture. Welcome to Mungadai World.
If you follow the other blog, you might have seen that leaning minaret before.

You cannot earmark bravery or budget patriotism

This is why our country is simply the best.

Using Precise Terms Precisely (II)

This morning's activities got me thinking: what exactly is a Mounted Combat Patrol? One will see or hear fellow soldiers claiming outrageous amounts of MCPs, or just CPs. As in, "I've been in Iraq for six months now and I've done 279 combat patrols."
Well, that's awesome, troop. So out of that 279, how many times did you make contact? How many rounds have you fired (actually aiming at a positively identified target)?
Any time one rolls out the wire via vehicle, it is classified--I think officially--as a Mounted Combat Patrol. Even if the patrol is just rolling out to drink some chai with an Iraqi counterpart (which was the Mungadai reason-for-roll this morning). Granted, one must make the same preparations, contingency plans, and conduct the same pre-combat inspections as if one were actually rolling out expecting to make contact and then close with the enemy and destroy him using fire, maneuver, and overwhelming violence of action, but all of those preparations occur prior to moving out the wire. So, is it not a little disingenuous to claim (yet another) Combat Patrol when one rolled out with no expectation or hope of getting in a firefight? Granted, you could bump into the enemy anyway (thus all the prep), but it's not the main intent of the mission. You can just as easily--and definitely more tragically--get killed while sleeping in your rack.
This morning, the Mungadai were just planning on drinking chai. I have a hard time equating these missions with those in which we roll out, link up with our counterparts, and go looking for a fight. I guess I'm just observing that at this point, I'm more than a little skeptical when a hardened "combat vet" throws out his triple-digit number of combat patrols right at the beginning of a conversation in order to establish his creds.
Dude, you were just drinking chai.

Commenting on Maneuver

Saw this over at the indispensable Small Wars Journal. A conference in Israel, by and for military professionals, on the meaning and future of maneuver. Dr. Russell Glen had a tough job writing this paper. This was obviously one of those rare jewels in military endeavors: a conference from which one emerges smarter for having attended. Usually, one emerges from conferences 1) lamenting the expended hours of life one can never get back and 2) mourning the loss of several points off of the ol' IQ.
Amalgamating the discussions of a conference like this into a coherent paper that imparts, to at least some extent, some of the wisdom shared and developed to those who could not attend is a daunting task. This article helped me get smarter (which is, indeed, testament to Dr. Glen's abilities). Couple of thoughts:
1. In the brief historical overview of maneuver, Dr. Glen mentions some of the rock-stars of maneuver warfare. But when touching on the American Civil War, he didn't mention Sherman. Sure, Lee and Jackson were mentioned, and Grant (as usual in this type of discussion) was the foil, embodying attrition, but how can one not mention Sherman? Talking about maneuver in the Civil War and not mentioning Sherman is like talking about Rock'n'Roll and not mentioning Elvis.
2. Later in the article, the "new" requirement to consider civilian populations in the application of maneuver in today's predominately COIN environment:

Now a planner or commander must instead incorporate concerns regarding how his organization’s maneuver will influence populations, an indigenous government, and other relevant parties so as not to alienate individuals or groups vital to objective accomplishment. The basic nature of maneuver remains unchanged; how it is applied and the influences that impact the employment of fire and movement to gain an advantage over the enemy have expanded considerably given such context.

But is this really new? Or just reemerging as the wheel turns? One could argue it was Napoleon's (portrayed here, accurately I think, as one of the founding fathers of maneuver) failure to plan for the reactions of the population to his maneuvering that laid him low in Spain. It was, after all, Napoleon's Spanish campaign that gave us the term guerrilla, a term that is not inconsequential today, although overtaken by "insurgent" and "militant."

3. One of the conference's objectives was to determine whether the doctrinal definition of maneuver can stand pat or needs to evolve, to expand in order to cover not just the movement and array of physical forces on the battlefield, but also all of the capabilities of a nation-state trying to reach its objectives. I don't have a dog in this fight, but I think that a word of caution is in order. Expand the term too much, and it becomes meaningless. The best example of this is the recent expansion of "Information Operations." Pretty much every instructor in every US military school right now will expound on how everything is Information Operations. Consequently, we suck at it. I would hate to see so sound and storied a Principle of War as maneuver suffer the same sort of dissolution, or diluted to the point--as with Info Ops now--where any moron can use it to justify his actions, no matter how retarded (or more likely, to justify inaction).

Personally, I'd keep the doctrinal definition as is, and use it as an organizing principle for contemplating the application of state power to a problem set (as the author does admirably in the article).

Good Times Comin'

This is so going to be a blast. No pun intended.

Thank you, Hitch

This is, necessarily, a non-political blog. I, like every other military officer of whatever political persuasion, will faithfully discharge my duties under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, regardless of his political party. When he is sworn on on 20 JAN, President Obama will be the fifth Commander-in-Chief I have served.
Still, I have to say, I find a lot of the vitriol and venom directed at our current Commander-in-Chief to be disheartening. I have no qualm with anyone who has a problem with any of his policies. There are some of his policies that I have disagreed with over the years. But the constant personal attacks against President Bush are unseemly and uncalled for. And none of the attacks are more so than those which call the President stupid. I'm not an extremely well-read guy. Okay, discount books by Louis L'amour and Mickey Spillane, and I'm really, really not well-read. But I respect people who are, and the President is. He's well read, smart, and principled, and he has had to make some incredibly difficult choices during some of country's most trying times. Calling him stupid is beyond the pale. Maybe he's not the most well-spoken politician on the face of the planet, but public speaking can sometimes be, you know, difficult--despite an Ivy League pedigree.
So, I'm glad that Christopher Hitchens said this.

h/t Blackfive

Dear Bill Gates

Dude, unfuck yourself.

Oh, my

Didn't know this when I started Mongo's Montreaux. Definition #1. Okay, I think it's growing on me.

What about Tap, Nap, or Snap?

The Economist has an article out articulating what President-Elect Obama can learn about the Mid-East Peace Process from the Clinton years. Couple things about it:
First,

Mr Clinton faced far riper circumstances in the 1990s than Mr Obama inherits today. He had in Yitzhak Rabin, Israel’s prime minister, a visionary leader willing to return the Golan Heights to Syria and negotiate directly with Yasser Arafat, whom previous Israeli leaders considered an incorrigible terrorist.

Uh, that's because Yasser Arafat was, in fact, an incorrigible terrorist. Granted, he was what Ralph Peters would call a "rational terrorist," unlike our current Al Qaeda cabal, but now we're differentiating between cockroaches and maggots.
Second, the article (which promulgates advice teased from a book by Martin Indyk called Innocent Abroad) asks:

Should the next president pile greater pressure on Israel? For all Rabin’s courage, notes Mr Indyk, he was “deeply cautious” towards the Jewish settlers in the occupied territories because he wanted to preserve his domestic political capital. Mr Indyk now thinks America should stand up to Israeli leaders when they plead political trouble at home to fend off pressure to curb settlements.

How about (ain't gonna happen, but one must ask) piling greater pressure on the Palestinians? In fact, given the recent events in Gaza, how about we tell the Palestinians "look, we'd really like to help you out, but until you stop your terror attacks on Israel, we are, in fact, going to encourage the Israelis to keep knocking the snot out of you. We endorse the kinetic solutions that the Israelis are taking to make themselves more secure, if not actually safe. We regret any loss of innocent life that result from Israel's actions, but if innocent life were truly one of your concerns, you wouldn't place your rocket launchers in schools, hospitals, and residential neighborhoods. Until you act like adult fucking members of the world community, we are going to encourage Israel to keep spanking you. Maybe, someday, you'll grow up."
Also, I recall reading somewhere that a good percentage of the Hamas rocket launchers were located in former Israeli settlements in Gaza. Sheesh.
Of course, that'll never happen. Everyone is going to keep kissing the Palestinians' asses and acting like they've got a legitimate beef (which, this generally pro-Palestinian article demonstrates they do not) and everyone will keep criticizing and "piling pressure on" Israel, which bends over backwards to avoid the collateral damage that the Palestinians take such glee in fomenting.

Using Precise Terms Precisely

The Vatican has released the names of this year's Christian martyrs. Man, it's been a long time since I've heard about Christian martyrs. And check it out: unlike some other religions I could mention, none of the Christian martyrs expired by blowing a suicide vest in a crowded market, or ramming a VBIED into a bunch of school kids (Pull Quote: "A surveillance video shows that the bomber could have waited for the children to walk past but decided instead to detonate his explosives, U.S. officials said. A Taliban spokesman was quoted calling the bomber a martyr."). Wow, a list where "martyr" doesn't equate to "murderer." It's a little disconcerting.

A Christmas Tragedy

We took indirect fire on Christmas morning. Through the day, the details trickled in, and we knew in short order that we (US Forces, not Mungadai) had taken casualties. For the Mungadai, Christmas was, more or less, just another workday. We heard and felt the blasts, but as the fire wasn't impacting right on us and it was sporadic, we just drove on with our day. Although we didn't really get the full story until a day or two after Christmas, we knew pretty quickly that one US Soldier died, two were wounded.

The doctor who was killed is survived by his wife and three children. Every Soldier lost is a tragedy--this is a phrase used so much that one could consider it a cliche, if it weren't so heart-rending. The saddest part of the whole thing is that his poor kids have not only lost a Father, but will forever be reminded of it on Christmas, a day which should be about joy, fellowship, and eternal hope. Our prayers go out to the Pryors.

An Israeli Spokesman on Iraqi TV

Had lunch with the Knights' Raid Commander today. Per usual Iraqi luncheon operations, we huddled up over a big plate of chicken and rice with various veggies and sauce bowls piled around the edges and dug in (with hands). Being a southpaw, this is kind of a bitch for me, as I've got to use my right hand for most of the tearing and sundering going on in the middle of the plate.
The news was on while we ate. Not sure which station (whether it was an indig Iraqi program or from some other Arab state). The show's anchor had a young IDF officer on to discuss Israel's retaliatory strikes into Gaza. The young man was bright and articulate; his Arabic was, as far as I could tell, flawless MSA (I'm not a subject matter expert, here, I'm only qualified to give my impression). Interestingly, the spokesman was an Arab Israeli. The discussion between the Muslim anchorman and the IDF spokesman was measured, congenial, and truly looked like a no shit dialogue. Never expected that.
Later, the anchor cut to Hezbullah's Nasrallah stating that Israel had better not try to export its shenanigens to LH and southern Lebanon and protesting that Israel's "indiscriminate" attacks had killed three girls in the Gaza strip. Around our chow (the cadence of which is best described as grab, rend, scoop, squeeze, stuff) both of my lunch companions, one a Sunni Kurd, the other a Shi'i Arab, expressed these sentiments:
-That fat asshole, children get blown up here all the time by "Muslims" and I don't hear him saying anything.
-Yeah, I'd like to beat that fucker like a dog in a mosque.
Interesting. My counterparts aren't shy about voicing thier criticisms of the US, the nascent Iraqi political system, Iranian interference in Iraq, or any other subject. Some of their opinions are wildly off base, some hit pretty close to the mark, and all are delivered with the passionate yelling and gesticulations that invariably accompany any Iraqi conversation. At no point during the newscast was there any vehemence or vitriol directed at Israel.
There are itty-bitty, teeny-tiny cracks appearing in my own perception of Monolithic Bloc Muslim anti-semitism.

Me Too! Me Too!

Outstanding evening/morning of night raids last night. After a couple hours of sleep, I had some shopping to do; Baby Bro Mongo recently got hisself a Jag. That's unacceptable, he's supposed to be trying to catch up to me (guess his tastes don't run to big-ass pickup trucks). So, not to be outdone, the Mungadai went out an procured a Jag, too. Hey, new tires, new windshield, and some spackle over all the bullet holes (or some whatever it is with which one repairs bullet holes), and we'll be stylin' and profilin'.

Essential Elements of Information

Okay, chances are that this guy is totally wrong, and that his acts were thoroughly detestable and unjustified; but how do we know?

The newspaper leaves out the most critical piece of information needed for the reader to make an informed decision: What was the movie?

If it was a Disney movie or some other family fare, then the guy was way, way out of line. If it was, say, a Tarantino holiday film fest, then the victim should've fuckin' known better.

I'm just saying, actions have consequences.

One Man's Cold Oatmeal

My biggest criticism of the GEN(R) McCaffrey report on his most recent trip to Iraq was of his statement that one of the mistakes we made in the war was that we had

issued illegal orders which resulted during the initial years in the systematic widespread mistreatment (and occasional torture) of thousands of Iraqi and Afghan detainees under our control.

My objection was that the US military does not and will not systemically direct nor tolerate torture, abuse, or mistreatment. When individuals do act in a manner that would be categorized as such, the military demonstrates--quickly--that it can and does police itself. One of the problems of discussing abuse/torture is the wide variance of definitions, and the spectrum of interpretations as to what is, and is not, permissible under international law, the US law of land warfare, and the Geneva conventions with regards to the treatment of detainees, prisoners, and prisoners of war.
The National Review published the best article I've seen yet as to the muddying of the waters on the torture dialogue. I guess that one man's cold oatmeal is another man's torture.
You can identify abuse or mistreatment anywhere, if your predisposed to find it. Sometimes, prisoners are "mistreated" because it is not physically possible to care for them any better. My counterpart's current detention facility is pretty austere, dirty, dark and gloomy--as are the barracks, offices, and common areas. The detainees are housed as well as the police, is that good enough?
Ironically, I think that under the current (hysterical) definitions of mistreatment of detainees/prisoners, you could make an argument that the 24th ID--commanded by then-MG McCafferey-- mistreated prisoners during the first Gulf War. We cared for them as well as we could while we continued to prosecute our mission. Had I deferred mission accomplishment in order to ensure that our prisoners were warmer, dryer, better fed, and all around more comfy-cosie than we were, MG McCafferey would've been the first to dig into my ass--and rightfully so.
One of the problems our military faces today is the highly partisan nature of the scrutiny of detainee/prisoner operations. The rules used to pass the common sense test, but now that the rules are being parsed in the rarefied air of partisan politics, common sense (guided by the experience and judgment of military professionals) is out the window. Our system is now insane (see Boumediene v. Bush).
The Geneva Conventions and the US' Law of Land Warfare were inspired specifically "by the desire to diminish the evils of war." These covenants unambiguously forbid the manner in which Al Qaeda wages war, and are meant to encourage warring parties to kill each other in a civilized manner.
Prior to 9/11, I would have said that if I came across my enemy on the battlefield dressed as a civilian and wantonly killing non-combatants, it would be perfectly legal to execute him on the spot. That I wouldn't do so would be as a matter of military policy and procedure, not law. Were I to take him into custody, I would treat him IAW the Geneva Conventions because that is what we are wont to do (we're the good guys), not what we are mandated to do.
I get the feeling that the extraordinary protections accorded US prisoners/detainees are a result of the fact that we are sitting fat and happy, and secure because of the lack of follow-on attacks since 9/11. Following another (as or more pernicious) attack, those who scream the loudest about the brutality of our military/security forces will be the ones screaming loudest that we haven't done enough.

Airman up for Medal of Honor for Actions in Laos, 1968

CMSgt Richard Etchberger was posthumously awarded the Air Force Cross for his valorous actions at the destruction of Lima Site 85 in Laos in 1968. 40 years later, the request to upgrade his award to the Medal of Honor is on Secretary of Defense Gates' desk. The link goes to a site detailing the story; the AF lost 11 of 19 men at the site, the largest loss of AF personnel during a single engagement in the Vietnam War. As is too often the case, the loss of life was preventable but for bureaucratic friction. These guys were at the sharp, shitty end of the stick.
Etchberger's sons only ever knew that there father died in a helicopter accident. I can't access the Army Times story on-line (yet) but one thing that stood out was

For 14 years Etchberger's sons didn't know the truth of their father's death, Cory Etchberger said.
His mother was briefed on the mission when she went to DC with her husband [before the mission], but was sworn to secrecy. Not until the mission was declassified did she tell her sons about what their father did in Laos.

That's hardcore.
The citation for Etchberger's Air Force Cross reads

On 11 March 1968, Chief Master Sergeant Richard L. Etchberger was manning a defensive position when the base was overrun by an enemy ground force.

The enemy was able to deliver sustained and withering fire directly upon this position from higher ground.

His entire crew dead or wounded, Chief Etchberger continued to return the enemy's fire thus denying them access to the position.

During this entire period, Chief Etchberger continued to direct air strikes and call for air rescue on his emergency radio, thereby enabling the air evacuation force to locate the surrounded friendly element.

When air rescue arrived, Chief Etchberger deliberately exposed himself to enemy fire in order to place his three surviving wounded comrades in the rescue slings permitting them to be airlifted to safety.

As Chief Etchberger was finally being rescued, he was fatally wounded, by enemy ground fire. His fierce defense which culminated in the supreme sacrifice of his life, saved not only the lives of his three comrades but provided for the successful evacuation of the remaining survivors of the base.

Sounds like a Medal of Honor to me.

The Mungadai salute CMSgt Etchberger, his family, and all the Airmen who gave their last full measure on that hilltop in 1968 and their families.

Back in the Saddle

The week of the Hajj is over. The week of home station celebrating by everyone who didn't get to Mecca tamped down attacks (despite the SVIED attack at the restaurant in Kirkuk). The week is over, the celebrations ended, so we can expect to see an uptick in both OPTEMPO and attacks.

The slow week was a good break, but I'm looking forward to resuming our normal (insane) OPTEMPO. At least then I've got an excuse for not catching up on paperwork, doing admin, going to the gym,etc.

I'm just saying, is all...

Soldiers bitch. They're great at it. I marvel everyday at the incredible support we get here, and derive great amusement from listening to Soldiers bitching anyway. Oh, sorry troop, was your lobster overcooked again? War is hell.
Still...
I had to go to the PX today, and wandered down the book/magazine aisle. Who procures for AAFES and decides what to sell to the guys? Case in point, they're selling Robin Cook's Coma. Nothing against the book, but it came out in 1977. What in the world makes someone think that there will be a market for it in the Mosul PX? I've seen that book in paperback aisles for as long as I've been looking at books in paperback aisles; what, is AAFES trying to introduce a new generation to the medical thriller?

AND...

The AAFES folks can ensure I can get my hands on a 30-year old paperback, but they run out of Copenhagen? And it's the plastic canned Cope, so it's not even like it'll go stale. It's an Army PX in Mosul, for crying out loud, are you afraid you're going to order too much friggin' Copenhagen?

I'm just saying...

What The...?

Man, I didn't even know this was going on. What the hell...I didn't even know his damn tomb was in Mosul...or that the tomb was missing a damn whale tooth.

Guess I need to check out BlackFive more often to find out what's happening in my own backyard. I suck.

Counterinsurgency, Infrastructure, and the Rule of Law

About two nights ago (they kind of seem to run together, sometimes) we spent the evening with the Knights checking the occupants of local hotels. That is, we ran up, secured the street, secured the building, then brought all the guests downstairs for interviews and ID card checks while the Knights checked the rooms, primarily for people hiding.
I'm not going to critique the various TTP on display, that's for Knight and the Mungadai internal consumption. But, what struck me was:
How, exactly, does one impose the rule of law when civil infrastructure is almost zero?
The biggest infrastructure issue that we've bumped up against previously is the leave policy. At any given time, a quarter of the ISF is on leave. They take leave because, once they get paid, they've got to go home and pay the bills. No banks, no internet for wire deposits, no checking accounts, no direct deposit. The troops get paid in cold cash, and then go home to pay the bills and take care of Momma and give her enough money to get through until the next pay day. And, because ISF at some point have to devolve from a unit taking leave and going out the gates together to individuals splitting off to go home, the troops are often incredibly vulnerable when they go home, susceptible to ambush, kidnap, and assassination. My last deployment to Iraq (05), the Iraqi chain of command would mandate that the troops leave the base in uniform. The troops were afraid to even carry their uniforms off base in a shopping bag, so we had to constantly replace uniforms that wound up in a ditch somewhere between point A and point B.

The problem here and now, in Mosul, is that the National Police (for that matter, all the ISF) are trying to segue from military operations to a combination of military and law enforcement activities, with the goal being to end up having to perform only law enforcement. As the rest of Iraq settles down, the rule of law becomes more and more important. The Iraqi Government needs to enforce and--more importantly, follow--the rule of law in order to gain and maintain its credibility and legitimacy. The hard part is doing that in an area like Mosul, where there is little to no infrastructure. I'm defining "infrastructure" here as all the shit that happens back home that we don't even have to think about. The hotel checks were an object lesson in the friction between the rule of law and social infrastructure.
How does one verify an address when there are no addresses? An Iraqi will generally say something like "I live near Haifa Street, in Baghdad" or "I live near the Zangeli traffic circle." There aren't any building or residential numbers, and a lot of the streets are not named.
How does one check a phone number when landlines are virtually nonexistent? You can check a guy's cell phone call log (if he hasn't erased it), but so what, unless you know the numbers on the register. In the US, the police need a warrant to get someone's call history from the cell phone company. Here, they are striving for the same standard, but what is the probable cause for the warrant? That the guy looks fishy?
The police were suspicious of all the hotel guests; they were from out of town, and who the hell decides to visit Mosul now? One guy had a huge wad of cash--suspicious. But Iraq is a cash-only economy right now. One guy had numerous sets of car keys on him, and stated that he was in the business of buying and selling cars. The National Police (and the Coalition) have been hit hard by VBIEDs the last couple of weeks, and anyone with access to multiple cars needs to be thoroughly investigated. But investigation equals more than interrogation, and without a sound infrastructure against which to check facts, gathering evidence becomes problematic.
We often hear references that Mosul (or at least parts thereof) are "like the Wild West." That's especially true when it comes to law enforcement. However, there is a definite difference between the imposition of a lawman's will and what we would think of as the "rule of law." Let's not forget that the men who "tamed the West" would probably suffer some pretty bad PR these days. From a law enforcement point of view, the Iraqi National Police are walking a tight rope--while people are shooting at them.

Movie Comments

Due to time constraints and OPTEMPO, I end up watching any movie in about a week-long series of 10-20 minute increments. As anyone who knows me knows, this drives me absolutely nuts. Still, it's better than putting a TV in my room (some of the guys have bought "garage sale" televisions from re-deploying troops; we procured an AFN dish and--boom--we're cooking with gas. I've abjured the television option, as I know myself well enough to know that if it's on, I won't be doing something productive that I should be doing. This approach will be modified when AFN starts broadcasting the new season of 24; at that point I'll be hanging out in Top's or Buddha's room for an hour a week--and yes, Voodoo, same thing whenever AFN puts a Chuck Norris flick on). Two movies that supplied something worth commentary were:
The Hulk: the new one with Edward Norton. Okay, liked it better than the first, and enjoyed the inclusion of Brazilian JiuJitsu into the screenplay. Tim Roth (much as I like the guy) was sort of miscast as the Bad Ass Operator that volunteers to take on the Hulk through similar treatments as those that transformed Bruce Banner. Roth looked reasonably kick-ass all kitted out in black; he probably could have pulled it off if the screenplay hadn't called for him taking off his shirt. After years of being an Operator in the Royal Marines, wearing full kit, the dude has to have developed something resembling traps, right?
So, when offered the opportunity to participate in the "Bio Tech Force Enhancement"--Super Soldier--program, he tells LTG Ross:

If I could take what I know now, put it in the body I had ten years ago...that would be somebody I wouldn't want to fight.

Isn't that the perpetual lament of professional soldiers everywhere, through history? That, when one finally reaches the apogee of technical and tactical proficiency, one has to perform despite the bum knee, the fused vertebrae, and/or the shredded rotator cuff? A good example of Hollywood accidentally stumbling on the truth when making a movie (despite the speaker of the truth being an unshaven Royal Marine wearing the US Army Class A uniform).

Equilibrium: Not too shabby. One has to swallow some wild improbabilities to get to the story, but okay, used to that. The one thing I appreciated, though, was the introduction of the "gun kata." I'm sure that, like me, most folks who have spent innumerable hours over the years training and adapting the Weaver stance (or modified Weaver stance), and concentrating on breathing, site picture, and trigger squeeze in order to deveolop a functionally sound and reliable handgunning capability, are driven to distraction by the point-the-weapon-anywhere-while-rolling-around-and-still-hit-the-target nature of shoot 'em up movies. At least this movie gave a plausible explanation for wild assed firing techniques and showed people actually having to train it. Kudos. Like any skill worth having, shooting takes practice, practice, and more practice.
Note to Hollywood: if you still want to strip out realism and keep showing movie characters shooting their pistols one-handed while holding the weapon lateral to the ground to the people (terrorists, insurgents, criminals) I may have to engage one day, by all means, feel free.

Relentless

We all know that Mungadai and knives go together like peanut butter and jelly, peas and carrots, blood and guts...
And no one makes a better knife than Relentless.
So we'd like to congratulate Relentless Knives on Hollywood's selection of the Relentless M4X as the blade-of-choice for Frank Castle in the new Punisher movie.
The Mungadai have a great affinity for The Punisher; he adheres to exacting standards, asks no less of anyone else than he would ask of himself, and metes out the appropriate measure of justice to those members of society who cannot or will not follow the basic precepts of the social contract.
If you go to the Relentless Knives ENewsletter, you'll see some friends of Relentless patrolling the streets of Mosul.

PS-For all the Mungababes out there, nothing says "I love you, Poopsie" like a Relentless Knife. It's the gift that keeps on giving...to Al Qaeda, to the Mahdi Army, to the Badr Corps, to the Quds Force...

Mumbai I: Radicalizing Moderates

One of my ongoing frustrations about the dialogue on the War on Terror is the assertion that when we (generally The West, particularly the United States) don't develop a perfect Course of Action that will appease the Islamic masses while we surgically cull the psychotically violent Islamist extremists, we radicalize the moderates and "create more terrorists." The two main branches of this theory are:
1. There is some type of moral equivalency between the actions of the United States, which takes measured, rational approaches to employing force, often limiting our actions and effectiveness and assuming greater risk for our troops in order to attenuate collateral damage, and the Islamists, who--as evidenced by Mumbai--prefer to take the Mad Dog Killer approach to their tactics.
2. While the Mad Dog Killers' actions are extreme, they are rational reactions to legitimate grievances over the policies of the United States, which has subjected the Islamic masses to all sorts of indignities (basically because, in short, we do stuff that they don't like).
Thus, the Mad Dog Killers of the Islamic Extremist set are justified in their passions and grievances, if not their actions, and it is incumbent upon the United States to address these grievances so that we don't continue to "make more terrorists" by radicalizing Muslims who would prefer to be moderates, but just can't overlook the indignities heaped upon them by the United States and therefore become terrorists.
Some big-brain thinkers, like Deepok Chopra think that we need to employ a Marshall Plan for Muslims in order to keep good Mohommadens from going bad, and that much of the Islamic terrorism the US has been subjected to over the years is the result of our not executing such a plan earlier.
My response to that? Fuck you.
Anyone who could be swayed to strap on a bomb and blow himself up at a school bus stop, or a market place, or a hospital is a fundamentally flawed sociopath. Ditto for those who finacially or materially support such people. Actually, the facilitators are even worse. Anyone who could be swayed to overtly target innocent non-combatants is not a moderate forced into terrorism out of desperation, he's a psycho who finally found an excuse. Can anyone imagine an American condoning the actions of a terrorist because, well, you know, he was responding to really egregious poliitcal policies?
Timothy McVeigh is reviled by every one of the disparate segments of US society, and rightfully so. Any apologist who tried to argue that he had legitimate grievances that need to be addressed by the US Government, that we, as a people bear some responsibility for his actions because of our failure to reform ourselves in order to allay the "root causes" that made him park that car bomb outside the Murrah Federal Building would be unanimously shouted out of the public square, and rightfully so.
The victims taken hostage in Mumbai were horrifically tortured before they were executed. No social, political, cultural, ethnic, or religious grievance justifies this. To all those Muslim "moderates" who faintly damn this type of atrocity with "yes, but..." there are no buts.
To all those who think that the US should change its evil ways in order to prevent otherwise moderate Muslims from turning to terrorism as a last-ditch effort to right a wrong, I've got a counter proposal: let's ramp up our OPTEMPO and get these fledgling terrorists radicalized now, in order to sooner get them on the target list.

*As an aside, I'm reasonably sure that, given his personal philosophy and fondness for the Bhagavad Gita, ol' Deepok, in a world where the US wasn't protecting his sorry ass, would find his head separated from his body by a rusty hacksaw blade wielded by a Muslim inspired by a host of "root causes." I note that Deepok hawks his New Age-ism from the US and not from, say, Karachi...or Mumbai.

Mumbai

The terror attacks in Mumbai require a whole host of posts. I've read some good commentary and analysis on the attacks, and their place in the War on Terror. A whole lot has been written about the attacks, and I'm not certain whether I can add anything new. As soon as I get done thinkin', and start writin', I'll do a series on them.