Backlash?

Still don't get it. In the way one does, in this information age, I followed Starbuck who led me to Attackerman who led me to The Washington Independent which led me to the Association of Patriotic Arab Americans in Military. Their statement on the atrocity at Fort Hood contains the following paragraph:

In the aftermath of this terrible tragedy, it is more important than ever that we not make the same scapegoating and broad stroke mistakes that were evident in the aftermath of previous tragedies. The Association of Patriotic Arab Americans in Military urges the media, government officials and all of our fellow Americans to recognize that the actions of Hasan are those of a deranged gunman, and are in no way representative of the wider Arab American or American Muslim community.

My response to every contact listed on their website is:

Gentlemen,
We are all reeling with shock and horror after the massacre of innocent Soldiers and civilians at Fort Hood, Texas. MAJ Malik Hasan was a sick and twisted individual, whose savagery and wanton disregard for the sanctity of life mark him as an abomination.

In our diverse and inclusive society, I feel more than confident that MAJ Hasan's actions will be seen accurately for what they were: The actions of a sociopath. However, the APAAM statement about the Fort Hood massacre, while correct in its condemnation of MAJ Hasan, left me confused and more than a little distressed.

Your statement said, in part:
In the aftermath of this terrible tragedy, it is more important than ever that we not make the same scapegoating and broad stroke mistakes that were evident in the aftermath of previous tragedies. The Association of Patriotic Arab Americans in Military urges the media, government officials and all of our fellow Americans to recognize that the actions of Hasan are those of a deranged gunman, and are in no way representative of the wider Arab American or American Muslim community.

Could you please tell me what scapegoating and broad stroke mistakes were made in the aftermath of previous tragedies? Do you mean within the military? Or within American society at large? I feel more than sure that in our current media environment with its instantaneous communications technology and voracious need for content, I would have heard of any hate crimes directed against Arab American servicemen or Arab American citizens at large. Yet I have heard of none, thus far. I did not hear of any after the bombings of our embassies in Tanzania and Kenya by Islamic Arab terrorists. I did not hear of any after the suicide-boat bombing of the USS Cole by Islamic Arab terrorists. I did not hear of any after the bombing of Khobar Towers by Islamic Arab terrorists. I did not hear of any after 3,000 Americans of every race, color, and creed were slaughtered on September 11, 2001 by Islamic Arab terrorists.

Gentlemen, could you please elucidate for me exactly what scapegoating and broad stroke mistakes you are talking about? By implying retributive hate crimes against Arab American servicemen after any of these events, you commit calumny against the vast majority of our uniformed service members (or, if speaking of Arab American civilians, the United States at large) who treat all of their brothers in arms with the respect and trust that is the due of any member of our Armed Forces (and the citizens of our great nation who treat all Arab Americans as, well, Americans).

I hope to hear from you.

I look forward to their response. I think this is the same pablum we've been hearing since before 9/11, and that there is no there, there. Or, I've been missing the boat on Arab Americans being persecuted for who they are rather than what they've done, and I have erred. I will stand shoulder to shoulder with any American, regardless of race, color, creed, or gender, and defend him against assaults on his God given rights. That was the impetus of the oath I took more than twenty years ago: I will defend our Constitution, and all of our citizens, unto death.
I'll let you know what the response is, if any.

MAJ Malik Hasan: Murderous Dog

As I read the coverage of MAJ Malik Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, mental bullshit flags are flying left and right.
First of all, I'm getting tired of hearing about "fears of a backlash" against Muslims:

Barack Obama today joined calls from across America for calm amid fears of a backlash in the wake of the shooting spree by a Muslim soldier at the Fort Hood that left 13 dead and 28 wounded.

Apparently, even the Army is getting into the act

Army Chief of Staff George Casey said ..."I do worry slightly about a backlash" against Muslim soldiers in the Army...

Does anyone even know of any real, substantiated cases of "backlash against Muslims" in this country since 9/11? I am so tired of hearing this trope, and am especially dismayed that the Army is knitting its brow in concern for our Islamic soldiers. Not going to happen: our force is too professional to allow any instances of backlash to foment, and I think our society is too inclusive and diverse for it to become a problem in this country. Sure, Hollywood will always weave a thread of American intolerance into its tales, even on shows I like, like 24, in order to demonstrate a societal moral equivalence between our cultures: "oh, see, we all must suffer violent extremists in our midst." Not happening.
Also, it looks to me a lot like news shows are bending over backwards to avoid intimating that Hasan was an Islamist/Jihadi son of a bitch. All kinds of reportage that "he was distraught over his impending deployment."
Bullshit. Not only are we an all volunteer force in general, but any soldier can get out of any deployment by going to an Army headshrinker--like Hasan--and saying "I feel stressed, this is making me homocidal/suicidal." Bam, instant relief from deployment requirements. [I know a guy that got sent back from Iraq like that; he wasn't "battle fatigued," nor was he suicidal/homicidal. He was a coward who verbalized those sentiments to a headshrinker specifically to get out of combat.] But our Soldiers didn't just volunteer for the Army, and then suffer the vagaries of being arbitrarily or wantonly flung into the combat zone. Instead, they volunteer every day, slugging it out to protect our country, when any one of them could get a ticket home with minimum effort. You can get out of combat by saying you're feeling homicidal, with no need to actually commit homicide. And there's no way that Hasan didn't know that.
Most rational people wouldn't need to pull out Occam's razor to start an investigation into Hasan's motivations with a look at the possibility that it was Jihadi movitivated. It is a plausible start point, it's rational, it's just not politically correct.

Term "Stone Cold Stud" is not Gender Speciific

A stud is a stud. Thank you Officer Munley, from all of us.

Heartbreaking

I'm pretty much a heartless bastard. I've worked very hard to become so. Still, this article demonstrates that I've still got some chinks in the armor. Damn, my allergies must be acting up again. I gotta go blow my nose.
H/T AoS

High Seas Seizure

I'm sure that the Israeli seizure of the largest weapons cache ever interdicted going into Syria/Lebanon on an Iranian ship is an anomaly. No harm, no foul, right? We can continue "negotiating" with the Iranians on their nuke program in good faith. This is not an indicator that the Iranians would ever be duplicitous.
The Syrians say they don't know nothin' about it, so it must all be a big misunderstanding, right?

Question is, is Schultzie a metaphor for the Syrians, or the American negotiators?

Fort Hood

Nothing to contribute on the slayings at Ft. Hood. Prayers go out to the families, friends, and brothers-in-arms of the fallen and the injured.

The Warrior Song

Okay, I'm old (relatively), broken (sorta/kinda) and bitter (after this last deployment, but I'm working through it).
Yet lo, after all all these years, this still pumps my 'nads. Fuckin' A.



H/T Tgace

Then, Just Like That, He Was

If your wacky, devil-may-care, acrobatic aviation paison offers you a once-in-a-lifetime shot at going up into the wild blue yonder, make sure you know the approved handholds. Approved handholds.

Again, from AoS.

Not Just A Hero...

...but also a stone cold stud. Mortally wounded with three GSWs to the chest and abdomen, the officer/agent scores a head-shot from 30 feet. Damn. We should all be humbled by that convergence of commitment and competence.

H/T AoS

Welcome Home, Brother

It's been a long time coming.

Duty...Country

Just so no one gets the wrong idea, I didn't catch that 187 pound Tiger Shark. My pizo cubano Furio did (more on Furio later). Still, that's my damn front yard they docked at and my damn danvit they're hangin' that booger off of. So, that's kind of like partial credit, right?
Actually, I'm in the midst of a lodging move right now, so all my shit's blown up like a TA-50 lay out in Dahlonega, and I've been doing zero angling, zero fighting, and zero blogging.
At some point, things'll settle down and I'll be able to begin to try to figure out why I gave this blogging thing a shot, and why I should keep at it, and where this blog should go now that I've repaired from Iraq.
In the meantime, there's sharks to catch. And--lucky for me--there're beers to be drunk whilst waiting for the guys who actually catch the sharks to come back in to the dock.

Dearth of Postingness

Yuh. I've not been posting. I suck.
But I've been doing really important shit.


Really important.

Running Is Bad For You, Still

What's the difference between a long-distance runner and a pronghorn?

...the husky and Arabian horse wouldn't run long distances if not pushed to do so. Animals run because they have to—to eat or avoid being eaten. Man is the only animal that runs simply to do it. Our large brains can convince our frail bodies to keep moving regardless of cost. We may not be the fastest animals, but we can run ourselves into the ground for sport, exhausting our food supply, and making ourselves susceptible to disease, injury and death. That's a feat no pronghorn can touch.

Jeffrey Dahmer and John Wayne Gacy Make The Case for Re-Defining "Serial Murder"

Okay, bit of a reach. But not much.

Going to see transvestites in Thailand is normal, the problem is whose money they used to go

Uh. Not sure any commentary is necessary. Is that Mao jacket getting a little tight around the collar?

Reap What You Sow, MFs (My Friends)

Looks like the Revolutionary Guards got a taste of their own medicine. Oh, and Iran is blaming us for either sponsoring or participating in the suicide bombing. Right.
So, Iran through its Hezbollah and AQ surrogates (AQ? How can that be? AQ is Sunni...) has turned suicide bombing into an art form. Then they bitch when the technique is used against them. Queue the itty-bitty violins. Reap what you sow, bitches.

Bureaucracy Brilliance, Installment #197

So, you're a public employee charged with managing the criminally insane. What sounds like good therapy for a homicidal maniac (I mean, that's actually not an epithet, that's a clinical description)? Why, take him to the county fair, let him loose, and provide little to no supervision. What could possibly go wrong?

Story has a "happy" ending, though. They got the guy back in the pokey before he managed to kill anyone. So, no harm, no foul? Right?
I love how the guy states that his escape was "unplanned." Who is more insane? The mad dog killer that got out, or the state authorities that provide an insane killer a "target of opportunity" for escape.

Autumnal Clearing

Okay, lot's of stuff in the "blog holder" bookmark that hasn't been published because I was either working, re-deploying, or on leave (and far too drunk to blog). So, I'm cleaning out the bookmarks folder and throwing up all the stuff I've taken a pass on the last month or so. Bear with me. Or "bare" with me. Whichever you prefer. After all, it's almost noon, so I've already started knocking back the oilcans.

Media Mores and My Money

WSJ interview with Andrew Breitbart, the guy who strategerized the release of the ACORN videos taken by faux pimp and prostitute, O'Keefe and Giles. The videos caused a sensation, and did all the things Breitbart claims in the interview.
Of most concern to me, though, is the fact that Mr. Breitbart and his crew got the story when other news outlets couldn't (even if they had wanted to) because

The approach Mr. O'Keefe and Ms. Giles used—lying to prospective sources or subjects—is grossly unethical by the standards of institutional journalism. Almost all major news organizations, including the Journal, strictly prohibit it. To be sure, there is a world of difference between employing such tactics and reporting on the results when others have used them. And there is no question that the pair's findings were newsworthy. But journalistic discomfort with their methods is a sign of integrity, not corruption.

I think that it is, in general, a good thing that newspapers will not lie to their sources--would that they had the same concerns about lying to the public (predominately, lying by omission). However, ACORN had accepted millions in federal funds, and my understanding is that they were programmed for billions more through the stimulus plan. That an advocacy organization is so replete with the most vile sort of corruption (facilitating the exploitation of underage sex slaves) is repugnant enough. That they were able to procure and manage millions/billions in federal largess is even worse. They were using our money to commit these criminal acts.
"We" have decided that organizations receiving federal funds are susceptible to having its compensation and payroll capped, and that the investment of federal dollars warrants federal organs monitoring and meddling in the private sector to "micromanagement" levels. I think that anyone accepting federal dollars should expect a corresponding level of scrutiny from the press.
Were every recipient of federal funds aware--"afraid," " leery," and "suspicious" are good, too--that every conversation about the possible illicit use of those funds could be a media "sting" operation, we might find fewer cases of this kind of corruption and abuse.
All federal employees are aware that, as pubic servants, they are subject to scrutiny far more invasive than that of the private citizen. Receipts and reconciliation documents for the expenditure of public funds have to be maintained--and are subject to inspection and inquiry--for years after the transaction occurs. Government computers, phones, and other IT are used with the understanding that there is little to no expectation of privacy. Why should a private sector organization or business accepting public funds get a pass?
The current tsunami of federal spending will spawn a corresponding storm surge of waste, fraud, and abuse. A free, independent press willing to ferret out the bad actors by any means necessary would only strengthen our republic.

As If S. Florida Isn't Creepy Enough

Okay, we've got gators and crocs. We've got sharks and 'cudas. We've got (biting) bugs of a quantity and quality most people can't even imagine. And now we've got snakes. Big. F'ing. Snakes.

Mass Cal in the Motor City

I've said before that running is da devil. Apparently I'm on to something; three died at the Detroit Marathon.

Missed It By That Much

Apparently, forty years ago I'd've been a contender.

Best Headline, Ever.

Even a devotee of the Jerry Springer Show couldn't dream this one up.

H/T to somebody, I forget because I was inebriated when I bookmarked it.

Why Hearts and Minds Are More Than Just a Sight Picture

The main reason to woo hearts and minds: because the populace gets a vote.

Looks Good To Me

The newest, most recently declassified recruiting video for the USMC. In true Devil Dog fashion, it is short, sweet, and to the point.

So, does MMA work as Street Defense?

Well, yeah, if you're dressed in drag and wearing heels in Swansea. Man, those dudes must really, really be secure.
Funniest though, is if you watch the video report at the end of the linked article, was the information that "the two men attacked the cage fighters in drag after attacking a man dressed as Spider Man.
What the hell goes on in Swansea?

H/T AoS

Home

Will start posting again soon. Right now, not doing nada.

A Quick Thought

Haven't--and won't--be posting regularly. Am sitting in the MWR computer room, catching up on e-mails etc and trying to read the back-log on the usual blogs. One thought occurred to me as I read through two posts on Starbuck's blog; I don't think they were meant to be mutually supporting, but his post on technology's contribution to micromanagement and on force protection and risk aversion both tweaked at a thought I've been having for a while now:
Why aren't we doing more long range patrols?
Even the guys that are (or, more aptly, were) in small COPs and JSS' seem to punch a time clock. You go out, you do your patrol or day's mission, and you roll back in. Granted, these smaller posts don't have the amenities that the super FOBs do, but still, every troop knows that after a hard day's work (which is usually substantially longer than the eight-hour work day, granted), he's going back to his rack, to his iPod, to his latest edition of black belt magazine.
How many troops now in Iraq (and Afghanistan) actually spend the night in what one would classically call a "patrol base?" Not surrounded with concrete T-walls and Hesco barriers, not in a known location from which the insurgents (et al) know that one will exit and return to daily?
With our technology (and, now that most Coalition have been given the boot out of urban areas) small patrols could move all day through non-urban terrain, stop after dark in a pre-mission reconned area that is defensible, and move out after a couple of hours to continue patrolling.
I'm wondering if this is being done in Afghanistan, and whether it is twined with the ISR and Fires capability that our air gives us. Long range patrols, that employ significant, dedicated air power to bolster lethality, may well be a way to decrease troop levels without increasing troop vulnerability and casualties. Plus, it would allow us to cover more area, have more exposure with the local populace, and reduce the predictability of Coalition comings and goings. MTF on this recommendation--this isn't a fully formed tactical theory so much as me jumping on my first chance to post in a couple days...

Heads Up

Posting will be intermittent and foreseeable for the near future. As soon as I get hooked up with regular and dependable internet access, I will begin posting again regularly. Inshah'allah.

Combat Advising at the Double Deuce

Dalton's words of wisdom.

Bad Prom Date Choice

There's an inside joke in my family: all good things come from Brazil. I'm thinking I may have to re-evaluate that particular sentiment.
Sheesh.

via Fox News

Fever Dreams

The canal outside my house winds through the mangrove swamps and out to big blue. The water is amazingly clean although the mangroves ensure that the water has a tea-stained tint. The tea colored water doesn't prevent one, when hanging out on the dock or the rocks, from seeing the brilliance of the fish below. The parrotfish and sergeant majors are always amazing. The best part of the canal is that one can (and often does) jump in whenever the urge occurs, especially on those really, really hot Keys days. The top three or four feet of water is bathwater warm, but always, always underneath a striation of incredibly cold water. Water that can turn the lips blue, and set the teeth chattering until one yearns (above and beyond the O2 deficit) to get back up into the sun...

It's been f'n hot the last couple of days. Blast furnace heat that makes seeking shade just a switch from "broil" to "bake." We had a break for a couple of days, and I thought maybe summer was thinking about tapping out. Apparently not. It's pant-like-a-dog hot; could be worse, though. We could be in Kuwait.

19 AUG Street Scenes

...are posted at the team blog.

Bullshit Flag Redux

I threw a bullshit flag earlier on the Human Rights Watch report that the Israelis committed war-crimes during their recent Gaza incursion, particularly by gunning down women and children waving white flags.
Michael J. Totten has dug up some pertinent facts about the report's author:

the gist is that the author of a recent Human Rights Watch report about Israeli soldiers in Gaza supported the infamous massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics by terrorists in the Palestinian Liberation Organization. And that's just for starters.

Yeah, this guy can be relied on to author a "just the facts, ma'am" report. Read the whole thing.

Combat Advising: Midwifery

Great article on the Strategy Page entitled "Why Iraqis Still Fight Like Arabs" (H/t: Mudville Gazette) The article highlights the (ofttimes seemingly insurmountable) cultural gap between the US and Iraqi militaries. We (the US military) are hostile and resistant to change; we are pikers compared to the Iraqis, though. The article examines Iraqi military culture through their ineptness at dealing with IEDs, but the traits revealed are true across the spectrum of military endeavors. I find the article reinforces most of my personal findings over the years in dealing with Arabs (and we all know how wonderful it is to find external validation for our preconceived notions). While I find the article is accurate in general, I thought it interesting comparing and contrasting with my current experience with the Federal Police, here and now, specifically:

Article:

Islamic schools favor rote memorization, especially of scripture. Most Islamic scholars are hostile to the concept of interpreting the Koran (considered the word of God as given to His prophet Mohammed). This has resulted in looking down on Western troops that will look something up that they don't know. Arabs prefer to fake it, and pretend it's all in their head. Improvisation and innovation is generally discouraged. Arab armies go by the book, Western armies rewrite the book and thus usually win. Despite years of American advice on this matter, many Iraqi police and military personnel stick with the old, less effective, traditions.

Me: This seems pretty accurate. We've found a decent success rate with pre-loading our counterparts with books/manuals, although we'll usually simplify products to the subject at hand down to just a checklist or handout, and distribute and carry ourselves checklists in both English and Arabic. We then, over time, condition our counterparts that on any given topic, they will see the same checklist over and over again. Initially, exposing them to any form to which they will have to commit an answer or fact (in ink, for the love of God!) on paper generates a great deal of stress. After a while though, they get into their comfort zone and can be reasonably relied upon to generate the information required or follow the established checklist sequence--especially if the form/checklist has enabled them to be perceived as "successful" before.

Article:

There is no real NCO corps. Officers and enlisted troops are treated like two different social castes and there is no effort to bridge the gap using career NCOs. Enlisted personnel are treated harshly. Training accidents that would end the careers of US officers are commonplace in Arab armies, and nobody cares. This is slowly changing, with the steady growth of a proper NCO corps and better officer attitudes towards their troops. But the old ways often return, with disastrous effects on troop morale and effectiveness.

Me: There is an NCO corps in the IFP, and some of our NCO shurta are actually pretty good. However, the NCOs get paid the same as the privates, so one of our biggest obstacles is getting shurta NCOs to stand up and take charge (and inherit all the headaches inherent in leadership) when there is no remuneration for doing so. When the chips are down, though, the enlisted leadership--both formal and informal--will usually step up and take charge, often on the basis of "because I'm bigger and stronger and I say so." Also, while the unit gets deplorable support from higher, unit leadership evinces strong, genuine concern for the shurtas' health and welfare. This has resulted, at least in the Knights' Raid Brigade, in relatively high unit identification and morale.

Article:

Officers are despised by their troops, and this does not bother the officers much at all. Many Arab officers simply cannot understand how treating the troops decently will make them better soldiers. This is another old tradition that dies hard.
and
Americans are taught leadership and technology; Arab officers are taught only technology. Leadership is given little attention as officers are assumed to know this by virtue of their social status as officers. The new generation of Iraqi officers and NCOs have been taught leadership, but for too many of them, this is an alien concept that they do not understand or really know what to do with.

Me: While the officers definitely have a different relationship to the troops than anything we're used to, I've got to say that my guys understand and value the role of the officer as leader. The Brigade Commander hails from a tribe with strong Beduin roots, so his idea of "leadership" definitely reflects the desert raider mentality (in line with the brigade's name, which literally translated is "the Raid of the Knights"). His leadership style (and expectations of his subordinates) is akin to that of a medieval warlord, who treats his men well but expects absolute loyalty in return. Rather than being "despised by his troops", he has established within the unit a cult of personality--which of course presents its own problems.

Article:

While American officers thrive on competition among themselves, Arab officers avoid this as the loser would be humiliated. Better for everyone to fail together than for competition to be allowed, even if it eventually benefits everyone. Still a factor.

Me: My guys are not real big on failure. Instead of "all failing together," they will marginalize weak or incompetent leaders, and while continuing to pay full deference to their rank, keep them out of the decision making/mission execution cycle. There is definitely a preference for "all winning together" over "all failing together." For example, in the operations shop, I have one O6 (full colonel) whose sole job is to take written orders from the "current operations" stack and, upon completion of the mission, bind them into notebooks for historical record keeping. Meanwhile, a young and extremely competent lieutenant colonel runs operations. Because of his proven history of success, he has the latitude to make and implement decisions far above what any O6 in the unit has. Within well-defined limits, of course.

Article:

Initiative is considered a dangerous trait. So subordinates prefer to fail rather than make an independent decision. Battles are micromanaged by senior generals, who prefer to suffer defeat rather than lose control of their subordinates. Even worse, an Arab officer will not tell a US ally why he cannot make the decision (or even that he cannot make it), leaving US officers angry and frustrated because the Arabs won't make a decision. The Arab officers simply will not admit that they do not have that authority. The new generation of army commanders and staff officers have been sent to Western staff and command schools, but there's still not a lot of enthusiasm for initiative (which is seen as a decadent and dangerous Western import.)

Me: Absolutely. I have seen division- and corps-level commanders huddled over a map, deciding where each individual vehicle will go in the cordon of a search operation. One of the values of the US Combat Advisory chain of command is that we can often reach up, through US advisors, and influence a more senior Iraqi commander to make a necessary decision and push it down before demanding an answer from a subordinate makes the top of his head explode followed by spontaneous combustion. We've discovered that, for example, if 1st Platoon is searching streets A through F, but has only received orders to search A&B, he will not move until ordered to do so. Even if the platoon leader knows he is going to eventually have to move to C,D,E, and F, he is rooted at the Street B limit of advance until he is ordered forward. This can be ameliorated through comprehensive discussions during rehearsals, but too many branches and sequels (still comprising a pretty basic set of instructions) will lead to confusion, doubt, and ultimately the same inaction we were trying to preclude. The key is knowing the partner unit well enough to know who is capable of making what level of decisions, and ensuring that you know how to reach that guy. It is better to leave a junior leader in place and spend 20 minutes to an hour hunting down the "right guy" for a decision than to try to berate, cajole, or threaten a junior leader into doing his job. If the guy is lower than battalion commander, the less you make him think, the better.

Article:

Lack of initiative makes it difficult for Arab armies to maintain modern weapons. Complex modern weapons require on the spot maintenance, and that means delegating authority, information, and tools. Arab armies avoid doing this and prefer to use easier to control central repair shops. This makes the timely maintenance of weapons difficult. Still a problem in Iraq, and throughout the Middle East.

Me: Uh, Federal Police don't have complicated weapons systems. Kalashnikov series weapons are about as high speed as they get (barring ad hoc weapons). Where we bump into maintenance issues is primarily with vehicles. Especially the Humvees. Especially the Humvees that we told them not to buy. Especially the Humvees that we told them not to buy because they don't have the parts on hand or logistics to maintain them. However, the Humvees considerably increase the survivability of the average shurta, so I can understand their ardour for the vehicles. Still, since they don't have the system to maintain their vehicles, but we do, then obviously we could square them away if we wanted to (when in fact, we would go to jail). When we don't square them away--i.e., increase their chances of living through the operation--even though we could "if we wanted to," this generates some real resentment. I think they would maintain their fleet better if they had the systems in place to do so, but the question is academic since their logistics apparatus is totally--what's the word? oh yeah--fucked.

There are some good points I didn't touch on in the article. While my experiences here and now are a little different, the article does a great job of describing the difficulties involved in trying to midwife a modern security capability in the Middle East. And just think, the Iraqis are waaaay more modern and sophisticated than the Afghans...

Getting Technical

Take a Soviet-made ZSU 23-4 anti-aircraft gun. Split off one of the four 23mm guns, mount it on the back of a Dodge pick-up, and you've got a "technical" that is a Somali warlord's wet dream. Contrary to what I initially thought, when the boys test-fired this thing 1) all the windows didn't blow out, 2) the pintle and mounting pylon stayed secure, and 3) the truck didn't flip over. While the whole set-up is ingenious, I have nightmares about what'll happen if my guys ever let rip inside the city with this thing...

16 AUG Street Scenes

Are posted over at the Team blog.

And yes, I know I double tapped a pic. I am just a simple caveman; this whole internet thing can be very confusing

Walking Back The Naked Man Snark

Okay, I've frequently--and rhetorically--asked the question: so what are the odds I'll ever have to fight somebody when one or both of the combatants is already sweaty and nekkid. Apparently, this scenario, while improbable, is not impossible.

They were forced to strip off their clothes and told to perform sexual acts when the male victim, described as a physically fit member of the military in his mid-30s, wrestled the gun away.

"He beat him until the stock broke over his head and then continued to beat him until he thought he had him incapacitated,"

via Drudge

Of Metal and Meat

Great article dissecting the pro's and con's of various combat calibers.
The 5.56 mm round comes off rather well. I'm not so sure, for all the reasons listed in the article. I'm not a huge fan of the 5.56.
One comment that piqued my interest was

Much experimentation has taken place to develop the "perfect bullet" and at present it appears to be something between 6mm and 7mm.

Word on the street from Huggy Bear is that USSOCOM is fielding new upper receivers for the M4 that chamber a 6.68 mm round. Would love to hear the feedback on those.
One important point on round development is that, in this blogger's humble opinion, you cannot discuss the "goodness" of various calibers in combat without acknowledging the revolution in optics that the military provides its servicemen. Most sights now are "aiming dot" type optics, in which the aiming point is the focus of a parabolic lens. Used to be, soldiers had to line up the iron sights of the weapon, and had to have the correct "sight picture" in order to actually hit the target. In fact, "sight picture" was one of the three fundamentals of shooting (the other two being breath control and trigger squeeze). So, the soldier's eye, the rear sight aperture, and the front sight post all had to be in line for the soldier to hit the target. And the soldier had to do it the exact same way every time, with his head in the exact same position in relation to the sights of the weapon. Now, when the troop puts the aiming dot on the target, that is where the round will strike (given that he doesn't hork up breathing or trigger squeeze) no matter what the relief of his eye to the sight is. This makes potentially problematic rounds, like the 5.56 mm, extremely more effective, since round placement on the target (nice word for "bad guy") is going to be consistently better.

Making The Best of The Worst Case Scenario

I've seen a theme on internet sites featuring classical martial artists and reality-based martial artists that denigrate Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu or groundfighting altogether. Most bring up some valid points:
-groundfighting on a hard surface is significantly different than doing so on a mat.
-groundfighting against multiple opponents (especially if some of them haven't hit the ground yet) is a lost cause.
-groundfighting strategies reduce mobility to unacceptable levels.
-in a real fight, reducing one's opponent and while remaining on one's feet is a winning fight strategy.

All of these are good points. And Lord knows, I've groused about the shortfalls of strictly BJJ or even MMA skills in a real fight. But--

-I don't plan on getting in a real fight. I've got pretty good people skills (okay, I've been well-trained in de-escalating a potentially violent situation, how's that?), a well-managed temper, and nothing to prove to anybody. So why would I ever get in a fight?
-If I do get into a fight, I definitely do not plan on being unarmed, whether I'm carrying a firearm, a knife, or any of a wide range of less-than-lethal tools that I own and with which I have extensive training.
-If the planets align for that once in a lifetime kismet induced situation where I do get into a fight and I am unarmed, I certainly do not plan to "go to the ground." I do plan on 50% of the participants in the fight going to the ground (ballistically), but not me.

So, if all of that has gone wrong, and I'm in a fight mano a mano (heaven forfend), why would I assume that I'm not going end up on the ground?
A lot went wrong if I'm in a fight.
A lot went wrong if I'm unarmed.
A lot went wrong if I'm on the ground.
At that point, how important is it that I can acquit myself well?
"Ah," says the gimlet-eyed skeptic,"but you have created a slippery slope coursing down which one can rack up all kinds of training requirements, and at the end of the day you don't have enough time to train every skill you'll need to defend yourself through the gamut of worst-case scenarios."
This is true. But I don't need as much time on the rifle and pistol ranges to build proficiency as I do on the mats. Bullets are wonderful things, and there's no training to "counter" a bullet. The first rule I learned for knife-fighting was KISS; again less training time required. Striking and throwing skills are more training/technique intensive, so yes, I dedicate the appropriate percentage of training time to them.
The survivability training paradigm I'm trying to articulate is: firearms, a couple of hours per month (I know, it should be more, and has to be for real pistolero status, but I'm talking survival, here). Blades (and kinetic/ballistic non-lethals), a couple of hours per week. Unarmed, a couple of hours per day (of which groundfighting is a significant percentage).
Thing is, while I spend more time on the unarmed (least likely/desireable) scenario, it is my considered opinion that a significant portion of the efficacy of those hours translates up, and helps with the other skill sets.
For example, shooting: proper breathing is of paramount importance--make that "proper breathing under extreme duress" is of paramount importance. I can guarantee that regular, quality groundfight training will improve the breath-control dimension of one's shooting game. Knife fighting: kinesthetic awareness is extremely important; you have to know--without necessarily being able to see--what your opponent is doing at his extremities, and what he is capable of doing given the relationship of his body to yours. Striking and throwing: same deal, plus one has to remember that economy of force and economy of effort is key if the fight is going to last more than 17 seconds (remember, you started your day believing there was no way you'd get in a fight, period). Pepper spray: okay, I'd have to think for a while to come up with a crosswalk from jiujits to pepper spray, but you get the picture.

So, What Do We Call It Now?

Haven't seen whether there is a DOD-approved replacement moniker for "The War on Terror." So what do we call it, now?
Seems like there might be a little more going on than just Iraq and Afghanistan, is all I'm sayin'.

Terrorist News Network

You may notice that every now and then I'll pull from Al Jazeera's English language news site.
Hate to say it, but on US domestic reporting they are as (or more) impartial and well-reasoned as any of the US mainstream media. So, I give them as much credence as the rest of the mainstream media on most of its reporting.

Granted, that isn't much.

Bullshit Flag II

Looks like Britain may be releasing the convicted Pan Am 103 bomber from prison.
Seems to me, the guy is either innocent--in which case you absolve him and set him free with damages paid--or his conviction stands, and his ass rots in prison (pun intended).
If he is indeed a mass murderer (or conspirator to mass murder) releasing him on compassionate grounds due to his terminal prostate cancer is ridiculous.

Bullshit Flag

Apparently Human Rights Watch is accusing the Israelis of murdering 11 white-flag-waving Palestinian women and children during its incursion into Gaza. So, let me see if I've got this right. The Israelis spend thousands of man-hours and what must have been millions of dollars surreptitiously mapping and data-basing the cell phones of every person in Gaza, so that when they attack any given building they can call all the non-combatants in the building to tell them to get the hell out of Dodge, only to shoot them down when they egress the buildings waving white flags. Okay, makes sense to me.

Hmm, Human Rights Watch. Hey, wasn't that the outfit that accused the Israelis of war crimes in the "massacre" of Palestinians in the Jenin refugee camp in 2002? Why yes, I believe it was, and that accusation was thoroughly discredited. In fact, the Israelis did more to protect Palestinian innocents than the Palestinians did themselves:

Dr. David Zangen, chief medical officer of the Israeli paratroop unit that fought in Jenin, has reported (and his report was confirmed) that not only did the Israelis not perpetrate a massacre, they worked to keep the hospital in Jenin open. They even offered blood to the wounded Palestinians.(9)

The Palestinians refused the blood because it was Jewish.

In response, the Israelis flew in 2,000 units of blood from Jordan by helicopter. They also made sure that additional units of blood reached hospitals in Ramallah and Tulkarem, and they facilitated the delivery of 1,800 units of anti-coagulants brought in from Morocco.(9)

Yuh. Okay, these sound like the guys looking for a chance to gun down women and kids waving white flags.

Hmm, Plagiarizing the Mungadai Business Plan

Okay, this competition has all the elements that make it a Mungadai favorite: lasers, beef jerky, and Frank Franzetta pictures. Obviously, the recession and unemployment must be higher than reported if this many people have time to compete.

-Beef Jerky business cards, it's a beautiful thing...

H/t AoS newsbar

What Would've Happened If He Farted?

There is a fine line between being a hard-ass vs asshole. Can't tell which side this judge falls on from the article. Still, I'm leaning toward respecting the guy.

Bizarr-O in Brazil

Okay, this is probably the most bizarre story I've read in a while. Whether the guy is getting framed or is guilty, it's disturbing on several levels.

via Drudge

Good On Ya, Irish

An Irish wedding party extends its hospitality to US troops on their way to Iraq.

Please Uncle Hugo, Make Christmas Come Early

Please kick off against the Colombians so we can watch you get, as my counterpart would say, beat like a dog in mosque.
Hugo doesn't have the stones to do it, though, because he knows what would happen.
I remember after the Colombians smoked FARC-ster Raul Reyes on the Ecuadoran side of the border reading that Hugo had ordered "21 tank battalions to move to the border." Unless a tank battalion in Venezuela consists of two up-armored golf carts, he was blowing smoke.
The Colombian Army has been gaining expertise through the expenditure of blood, sweat, and tears fighting the FARC, the ELN, and to some extent the AUC. While none of these are conventional opponents, the resultant capability would mean that Hugo would get to reap what he's sown. Oh, and throw in the fact that Prez Uribe doesn't back up at all, ever.

Shark Jumps Into Fisherman's Boat...

...and starts beating hell out of everything. Right off the FL coast near Miami. Great. Can't wait to go home and go fishing.
The shark that jumped into the boat is a bull shark; they are the most aggressive and are responsible for more attacks on humans than any other shark.

Sounds About Right

The Washington Times reports that the ingredients for a civil war in Iraq are present, and possibly starting to brew. The article focuses on a report by Najim Abed al-Jabouri, former Iraqi mayor and the Police Chief that "cleaned up" Tal Afar, who claims that the biggest contributor to a possible civil war right now in Iraq is the ethno-sectarian splits within the Iraqi Security Forces. Says Mr. al-Jabouri:

"U.S. efforts to rebuild the [Iraqi security forces] have focused on much needed training and equipment, but have neglected the greatest challenge facing the forces' ability to maintain security upon U.S. withdrawal: an ISF politicized by ethno-sectarian parties," he wrote.

"These ties pose the largest obstacle to the ISF in its quest to become genuinely professional and truly national in character. A professional military force holds the best prospect of gaining and keeping the trust of the people, but a force riven with destructive sectarian and ethnic loyalties is a recipe for civil war."

Obviously, I've got a limited view from my perch hear in Mosul, but this sounds about right. My counterparts in the Iraqi Federal Police (until very recently known as the Iraqi National Police) have a vehement, visceral distrust of the Iraqi Army. The IA, far more robust in its training and logistics systems to date, have a multitude of capabilities that the IFP don't. American commanders constantly defer lending a hand with US capabilities to help my guys out, stating that we need to "coordinate" with the IA and have them come on over and help out. Here's the deal: my counterpart would rather tear an eye from his face than ask for or recieve help from the IA. To the point that a couple of weeks ago, after the IFP had a fruitful day of harvesting IEDs, which they--gulp--happily brought back into their own headquarters, US forces refused to send EOD out to take control of and reduce the IEDs. Instead, I was told, tell them to get the IA to do it, natch. My counterpart's response to my entreaties to use the IA EOD was that he'd rather keep them for "later." So the explosives got to sit there for an extra day while we figured out an alternative means by which to dispose of the ordnance. There have been more than a couple of times that I thought the IA and IFP might go all "Hatfield-McCoy" on us. Thankfully, we've managed to calm those situations and have yet to have an incident that is both serious and sustained. Still, internecine security force hostility is always simmering just below the surface. Even within the IA there are fault lines:

The majority of these divisions are under the patronage of a political party," he writes. "For example, the 8th [Iraqi army] division in Kut and Diwaniyah is heavily influenced by the Dawa Party [of Shi'ite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki]; the 4th IA division in Salahuddin is influenced by President Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan; the 7th IA division in Anbar is influenced by the [Sunni] Iraqi Awakening Party, and the 5th IA division in Diyala is heavily influenced by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a Shi'ite political party with some ties to Iran.

As I've posted previously, most of the ISF and civilians I speak to think that when the US pulls out, there will be a bloodletting, but then things will settle down and people will live the "Iraqi way." As bad as that sounds, almost unanimously the Iraqis I speak to say that they will never again suffer a despot. Most will point to their satellite dishes and cell phones and say, "because of these, we have learned to say no."

Tactics vs Strategy

Starbuck is generally the go-to guy for Military/Web 2.0 interface. He keeps his finger on the pulse of the military's adaptation of new and emergent information technology (for example, see his posts here and here)--although he seems to have a much harder time keeping his fingers on his ID card. Heh.
I thought that this article was more up Starbuck's lane to comment on, but figured I'd have a go at it. To wit, it seems as though the Air Force, which blocks its members from using social networking sites, also monitors these same sites to guage public opinion and then advise the supported Commander how best to "craft his message" in response (or maybe even proactively). I think that this is a viable technique, and that this sort of information mining cell could someday be more accurate and reliable than public opinion polling. In this particular instance, the monitors were deployed to observe, assess, report, and make recommendations to counter the negative publicity of this spring's Air Force 1 flyover of Manhattan. The consolidated conclusion of this crack cell of cyberslueths was "No positive spin is possible."
[Gee, do ya think? Maybe I should pitch some military department to set me up with a cush job guaging the public perception of future events with my incredible ESP.
-We are going to make an unannounced flyover of Manhattan Island with a jumbo jet and a couple of fighter jets, what do you think will happen, O Amazing Mongo?
-the public will have a raging case of the ass and you are retarded. Next question.]
I'm not real big on web-based social networking, probably because I'm not real big on social networking, probably because I'm not real social.
Personally, I have no issues with educating soldiers on "do's" and "don'ts" of social networking and then letting them have at it. But the debate over social networking, which is sort of a collateral information operation, kind of misses the point, in my opinion.
The point is that we suck at information operations.
Because The Brass is 1) making "perfect" the enemy of "good enough to accomplish the mission," 2) afraid to piss off anybody, anywhere with impolitic language or viewpoints, and 3) distrustful of their subordinates' ability to articulate the command approved message (or at least not torpedo it), we get our asses kicked worldwide when it comes to disseminating information in such a manner as to forward the national interest.
Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace are, if you will, tactical media that will be replaced by or evolved into something totally different in a few short years. The military departments will either adapt to the proliferation of social media and personal information technologies or not, but I sincerely doubt that they will adapt to the point that they can successfully leverage and exploit them; that's just the nature of bureaucracies. Even if there are some titanium stovepipes of excellence built--such as the Combat Information Cell at Tyndall-- that can leverage networking media to great effect, the capability will be diffused by the bureaucracy.
As I said, though, these media are tactical. What we truly lack is not only an information strategy, but an even higher ordinate set of organizing principles for information operations, information management, and information exploitation (doctrinally, you could probably roll all these into "Information Operations," but like our IO execution, our IO doctrine sucks).
While we fritter over Twitter, we are losing sight of the requirement to forward a national strategic message--and to influence those of our competitors and thwart those of our enemies.

10 AUG, or "Why I Love Aviators"

Scenes from today's operation posted over at the team blog.

A couple of posts down, I spent some time articulating my gratitude for the aviators that cover our asses every time we go out. Our air cover performs two vital functions: close air support--i.e., firepower, which is pretty much what everyone thinks of when they think of air cover, but more frequently and as importantly, they provide invaluable Situational Awareness. I often can't see two or three blocks away. The air guys tell me what's going on around me, whether we have any "squirters" trying to escape if we hit a building, suspicious vehicles approaching our formation, groups of military aged males congregating in our general vicinity, and even where our counterparts went if they haul ass and leave us to lumber behind (this frequently happens on night operations). And, they give us the heads up on trains. From today:
-Mungadai 6, this is BlackJack 5.
-Go ahead BlackJack 5.
-Be advised you've got a train headed your direction. Should be there in a minute or two.
-Thanks, BlackJack 5.
-Uh, Mungadai 6, that train is on the same set of tracks that you're traveling on.
-Roger. Stand by...
Hilarious hijinks ensue.

Duty, Honor,...Diversity?

I've read two articles on the US Naval Academy (one of which is here, the other's link expired), the general import of which are that at USNA, diversity is now the priority for admissions.
I've got nothing against diversity, per se, but once a service academy starts prioritizing diversity over other indicators for military leadership potential, I think you are courting danger.
I'm sure some young Seaman is going to think "Well, the ship is going down in flames, and we're all going to die, but at least my Captain is (black/asian/hispanic/female/Pacific Islander) like me."
I would think that in selecting young men and women to be educated, trained and inspired to lead our nation's soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines in battle and bring them home again, the content of one's character would be more important than the color of one's skin.
This would usually set off my perennial Army chauvinism, and I'd make some remarks about how the Navy is suffering PC-induced lameness, but the same day I read the article the Army posted its own accolades to diversity. On to AKO, the Army portal through which we get our official e-mail and perform various and sundry administrative tasks, the Army usually posts a motivational, scene-from-the-force picture that you can look at for the ten minutes it takes to log on. These are usually topical and there is a rotation, so that you see a different picture from the same pool every time you log on. So in celebrating the new West Point class' graduation and matriculation into the Army, I saw a picture like this with the following caption:

U.S. Military Academy graduates toss their hats during commencement ceremonies at West Point, NY, May 23, 2009. Of the 970 cadets, 144 are women, 63 African Americans, 62 Asian/Pacific Islanders, 74 Hispanics and 15 Native Americans. The majority of the class, which also includes 17 foreign students, were commissioned second lieutenants.

So, this is the best the Army can do? The most noteworthy attribute of this cohort of great young Americans who volunteered to compete to undergo a physically, mentally, and emotionally grueling four years in order to better lead our soldiers in a global war on terror*, which currently has two hot theaters of operation is: look, we're diverse!
The Army does these young leaders, and its troopers everywhere, a disservice by hawking the diversity of this graduating class, instead of recognizing the talent, motivation, and tenacity they have all demonstrated to get where they are.
*yeah, I know, I'm not supposed to say that anymore. When I get the new, approved brand name for this goat-fuck, I'll go back and amend the post.

Sounds Like He Deserved It, But Still...

She has been charged with causing bodily injury and endangering private property.

Well, duh.

Profile in Courage

So, we've got 18-year old kids risking their lives over here on a daily basis, going out the wire to do route-clearance, EOD- or VIP-escort, to check on US infrastructure projects, and any number of dangerous jobs.
And back home, as the health care debate heats up, we've got a report that:

A spokesman for North Carolina Rep. Brad Miller has told reporters that his boss won’t be holding town hall meetings this month after receiving a death threat.

Way to go, sir. Way to pay back your constituents and countrymen over here facing real danger to give you the right to cower in the corner. Schmuck.
(I took the guy's party affiliation out of the quote; gutless is gutless, I don't care what side of the aisle he's on)

The Security Blanket

"Alone and Unafraid" is the unofficial motto of the Transition Teams. The first part has never been more true since the retrograde of combat forces out of Iraqi cities. The second part is due, in large part, to the odds of looking up and seeing one's air support, as pictured here (you can click on the pic to enlarge). I make it a general practice to always give aviators a hard time--a habit that has stood me in good stead thus far. But, I gotta say, our ubiquitous, flexible, and always-accommodating aviation brethren not only let me sleep soundly at night (or day, whatever), but let me do so with a minimum of thumb-sucking and bed-wetting.

Interludio Colombiano

I might've actually been at this event. Uh, no recuerdo porque fui muy borracho.

A Rock For His Pillow

Street scenes from today's operations are posted over on the team blog.

One mentionable from today: we hung out for a while near the, ah, domicile of a propane vendor. Because the power grid is notoriously unreliable, most Iraqis cook with propane. Vendors drive their motorized mules around town hawking their wares. Propane tanks also make great IED canisters. So you can imagine our joy (and the little spritz of adrenaline) every time one of these babies turns the corner and starts ambling toward you. Good stuff.


The vendor and his family pretty much just own the mule, the propane tanks they sell, and the clothes on their backs. That's it. Here you can see the wire mesh pallet on which the family sleeps. Note the outdoor cradle for junior (as always, you can click to enlarge the picture).

Thug vs Warrior

The Urban Samurai asks whether MMA training is useless for street defense.
He makes some great points, and I agree with his overall assessment: an MMA fighter is better equipped to defend himself than someone who doesn't train at all, but MMA is definitely not the comprehensive solution to self defense. However, I think I came to that conclusion via a different route than the Samurai. I think he and I are at some variance as to our philosophical, technical and legal reasoning.
First, on the legal side, I think that there is something amiss in the UK right now. More and more, the courts are punishing individuals who defend themselves against violent criminals. One could even make the case that there is no inherent individual right to self defense in the UK right now (I know, I need to round up some links to back up this supposition. Later).
Here in the US, I'm thinking that you can reasonably expect to escape criminal sanction (although maybe not civil) if you can demonstrate under the "reasonable man" doctrine that you acted to negate the threat against yourself. So, unless your caught curb-stomping an unconscious assailant, you shouldn't be rolled up by the law. I'm not a big fan of martial artists who only aim to subdue or "control" an assailant, because I think they are underestimating both the danger, the consequences of screwing up, and the skill level required to only subdue a fully adrenalized, motivated attacker without injuring him. It can be done, but would you risk your life to spare your assailant a couple weeks/months in traction?
The problem with bringing MMA skills into a self defense situation is that the mixed martial artist is trained to fight. Your attacker isn't looking for a fight, he's looking for predation. So, as the US points out, your attacker isn't going to constrain himself to the "rules," pattern, or tempo of the fight an MMA guy has trained for. He's going to try to neutralize you as directly as possible. If a predator decides to target you, reduce his ability to do so by every means available. In most states, the use of lethal force is legal if it is employed to avoid grevious bodily harm.
Here are some more shortcomings of bringing your MMA game to a fight:
-As US points out, the environment will be different. Look at the significant difference in fighters' tactics and techniques between Pride and UFC, simply because one fight takes place in a ring, and one in a cage. To an extent, MMA fighters train and compete, over and over again, in order to perfect the same fight. Same cage, same matted flooring, same gloves, mouthpiece, rules and fight duration (excepting KOs).
-I've bitched here about gloves before; I'll do so again. The purpose of gloves in MMA is to protect the slugger, not the sluggee. The crowds love a good knockout, and the gloves allow a professional fighter to swing for the fences without endangering his livelihood. Swing for the fences like that barefisted, significantly amplifying your power through the hips and shoulders, and when you make contact with that punch you will reduce your punching capability by 50%, because you just broke your hand. That treasure trove of combative knowledge, FM 3.25-150 states that

The boxer is a better puncher than the traditional martial artist not because of the mechanics of punching, but because his technique has been refined through competition. (App B, Para 1)

Um, no. The boxer is a better puncher with gloves on than the traditional martial artist. After a barefisted fight, he'll have earned the appellation "Cast Boy."
-Fight Fashion: how wrong have things gone if you're in a no-shit fight with a sweaty guy wearing a spandex bikini? The ordinary street clothes that an attacker (and hopefully you) will be wearing make a distinct difference. Both participants have a wider range of fight options on a fully clothed opponent.
-Improvised Weapons: Original Japanese Jujutsu was developed to give a samurai who'd lost his sword the ability to survive on the battlefield until he could procure another weapon. If you are attacked when you are (for whatever insane reason) unarmed*, the odds are good that you will grab the first field expedient weapon to hand.
-Asphalt, gravel, and tarmac sort of change up the dynamic of groundfighting and "ground and pound."
-Targeting: an MMA fighter is, sure, defending himself as completely as possible. But his "muscle memory" doesn't encompass eyes, balls, kidneys, throat/larynx. Stick a thumb in the eye of the guy with even the best fight composure, and you'll generate an effect. Get kicked in the balls enough, and lo, you can learn to ride it out, but has a MMA guy been kicked in the balls enough? (I'm in the Army, so the institution takes care of that training requirement).
On the philosophical side, if someone is willing to attack me, then they are willing to kill me, even though that may be inadvertant. So, I'm fighting for my life and will use the most powerful response I can. Also, I will not try to reply with an unarmed version of escalation of force; there isn't time and my opponent faces no such restrictions. I am sure that some of the lessons I've learned in my MMA adventures will come in handy, but I definitely would not opt to rely on MMA as my sole source of skill sets.

*Yuh, looks like I've got to re-test the BATTLEMIND training.

Weather Update

Starbuck posts a great description of our recent meteorologic travails.
From a sensory point of view, it is kind of cool to look outside to see the world in what can only be described as sepia tones.
Otherwise, the weather sucks.

Suasion of the Battlemind

The Army starts us on our redeployment bureaucratic milestones about 100 days out from taking the freedom bird. There are all kinds of administrative tasks that needs be accomplished (evaluations, awards, follow-on orders, etc), property must be accounted for and prepped for turnover to the next team, and mandatory classes must be attended to ensure we're ready to assimilate back into "the world."
I'm posting on the training that the Mungadai did today because, for once, I was reasonably impressed by the Chain Training we were given by the unit Chaplain. The training centered on transitioning from the mental state required here to the mental state that you need to adopt when you get home (if you want to avoid jail, disciplinary proceedings, divorce court, etc). The training was centered on the keyword BATTLEMIND.
Keywords are basically mnemonic devices for finding the "key" to succeeding in different situations. For example: stuck in a cold weather survival environment? Don't forget keyword COLD (stay Clean, don't Overheat, dress in Layers, stay Dry). Screw up your knee yesterday diving for cover when Voodoo snuck up behind you and yelled "bang?" Keyword ICE (Ice, Compression, Elevate). Today was the first time I've seen BATTLEMIND, and I thought it did a good job of breaking down the dimensions in which returning soldiers need to adjust their mindset.

Buddies (Cohesion) vs. Withdrawal
In Combat: No one understand your experience except your buddies who were there; your life depended on your trust in your unit.
At home: You may prefer to be with your battle buddies rather than your spouse, family, or friends; you may assume that only those who were there with you in combat understand or are interested; You may avoid speaking about yourself to friends and family.

Accountability vs. Control
In Combat: Maintaining control of weapons and gear is necessary for survival; ALL personal items are important to you.
At home: You may become angry when someone moves or messes with your stuff, even if it is insignificant; You may think that nobody cares about doing things right except for you.

Targeted vs. Inappropriate Aggression
In Combat: Split second decisions that are lethal in highly ambiguous environments are necessary. Kill or be killed; Anger keeps you pumped up, alert, awake, and alive.
At home: You may have hostility towards others; You may display inappropriate anger, or snap at your buddies or NCOs; You may overreact to minor insults.

Tactical Awareness vs Hypervigilance
In Combat: Survival depends on being aware of your surroundings at all times and reacting immediately to sudden changes such as sniper fire or mortar attacks.
At Home: You may feel keyed up or anxious in large groups or situations where you feel confined; You may be easily startled, especially when you hear loud noises; You may have difficulty sleeping or have nightmares.

Lethally Armed vs. "Locked and Loaded" at Home
In combat: Carrying our weapon at all times was mandatory and a matter of life or death.
At Home: You may feel a need to have weapons on you, in your home and/or car at all times, believing that you and your loved ones are not safe without them.

Emotional Control vs. Anger/Detachment
In Combat: Controlling your emotions during combat is critical for mission success and quickly becomes second nature.
At Home: Failing to display emotions around family and friends will hurt your relationships. You may be seen as detached and uncaring.

MissionOPSEC vs. Secretiveness
In Combat: You talk about the mission only with those who need to know; You can only talk about combat experiences and missions with unit members or those who have "been there, done that."
At Home: You may avoid sharing any of your experiences with family, spouse, and friends; You may avoid telling your family etc where you are going or when you will get back (and get suspicious when they ask).

Individual Responsibility vs. Guilt
In Combat: Your responsibility is to survive and do your best to keep your buddies alive.
At home: You may feel you have failed your buddies if they were killed or seriously injured; You may be bothered by memories of those wounded or killed.

Non-Defensive (Combat) vs. Aggressive Driving
In Combat: Driving unpredictably, fast, using rapid lane changes and keeping other vehicles at a distance is designed to avoid IEDs and VBIEDs.
At Home: Aggressive driving and straddling the middle line leads to speeding tickets, accidents, and fatalities.

Discipline & Ordering vs Conflict
In Combat: Survial depends on discipline and obeying orders; Following orders kept you and those around you safe and in control.
At Home:Inflexible interactions (ordering and demanding behaviors) with your spouse, children, and friends often lead to conflict (ooh; apparently these guys know Mrs. Mongo).

The training presents templates for transitioning the combat skills into acceptably peacetime behaviors, with modification tips and mental health resources. I thought it was post-worthy because a) somebody obviously did a decent analysis of combat vs homefront mindset and behaviors and b) the Army is often portrayed in the media and popular culture as an uncaring monolith that views soldiers as expendable, disposable means. This is untrue and unfair, and I thought an example of our redeployment (mandatory, hours and hours long) training was a good counterpoint to that.
I'm not saying I agree with everything here (scan down for Mongo's Rule #1), but I'm saying a more than significant effort was made to help troops make the jump with the least amount of friction--and there always is friction. The first time you go to a mall or Walmart when you get home (excluding those adjacent to military posts) you are generally overwhelmed with a sense of "who the fuck are these people? Don't they get it?" As the keyword above intimates, tempers are pretty volatile, mostly because, for over a year, whenever someone absolutely needed a world-class ass whuppin', you By God administered a world-class ass whuppin'. From what I hear, that's generally frowned on in Walmart.

It's Time To Go, or Mr. Congeniality Has Left the Building, or Total Paranoia Equals Total Awareness

Some anecdotal proof that one year is about the tracer burnout for a combat advisor.

First, I do believe I'm getting a little cranky as my tour here winds down. Things that I should be taking in stride are irking the shit out of me, to the point where it is showing through my usually sunny disposition. Some examples:
-the DFAC: look, the Mungadai are really lucky to live on a large FOB with a large DFAC that has about everything you could want to eat (whether you should actually eat everything you want is a different story altogether, especially now that we're not spending fourteen hours a day burning calories by running around the ville in body armour). But, not all DFACs are set up uniformly, and you kind of need to know where you're going to get what you want. If you've never been in the DFAC before, step to the side, out of the human traffic flow, in order to do your recon. Don't stand in the middle of the "path" gawking. Otherwise, there is a very good chance (and getting better every day) that certain combat advisors will counsel you with a ballistic application of a food tray up against your damn head. Capische?
Next, the purpose of the DFAC is to allow you to grab and consume your chow and then haul your happy ass back to work. The fact that our DFAC is very large ups the percentage that you can find some food that you will actually enjoy consuming. But hey, all of our chow is line-hauled in. Which means that you don't stand at the salad bar trying to cherry pick the very best of the veggies, dumbass. All of the lettuce is slightly brown and wilty. All of the cucumbers are freezer burned. Either eat it or pass on it, but don't stand there holding up the line in pursuit of building the perfect salad. The rest of us have jobs and therefore don't want to stand there all damn day. Again: Tray. Head.
-Showers. I've been in the Army a long time. I've deployed a lot. So I've pretty much got the ergonomics of my morning ablutions down pat. But I'm not that good. There are 14 showerheads in two abutting trailers for about 167 swinging dicks. That means that there is not enough hot water to go round. If I can enter the trailer, brush my teeth, shave, shower, towel off, and exit the trailer and you've been in the shower the whole time, then you are a hot water Blue Falcon.
-Paranoia. I've been sitting with my back to the wall, scanning people's hands and eyes, and dodging every trash and rubble pile in the street for quite a while now. Total paranoia is total awareness. So maybe I'm just interpreting the news a little differently than I otherwise might. But does knocking out and hospitalizing 34 people with just a little spritz sound like a bad batch of froo-froo juice, or a trial run? And a Google-employed computer super genius gets bonked on the head by a 100-pound tree branch in Central Park? And all the trees in the area are healthy, even the tree from which the offending branch fell? C'mon, what world are you living in?
12 months, I'm good with. 24 months? That's stretching it.

And Now, From The Polio School of Handgunning

Got this video of a gangbanger accosting a skateboarder via Mr. Rummel at Hell in a Handbasket.
Couple of observations:
-Keep teaching gangbangers that this is how to hold/use a pistol.
-How lame do you have to be to approach an unarmed skateboarder whilst brandishing a pistol and still get your ass kicked?
-I'm amazed that no one was shot. Just goes to prove that sometimes it's better to be lucky than be good.
-The skateboarder in red board shorts--i.e., the intended victim--probably broke his hand while admonishing the gangbanger.
-If I was the 'boarder, immediately after this little donnybrook I'd whup my buddy's ass for a less than surgical application of his skateboard.

Well, then, I'll Just Take My Bat, And My Ball, And Go Home.

Holy Schnikes.
COL Timoithy Reece, who I think is the Baghdad Operations Center Transition Team Leader, just published a brutal strategic assessment of our post-30 JUN operating environment in Iraq.

The GOI and ISF will continue to squeeze the US for all the “goodies” that we can provide between now and December 2011, while eliminating our role in providing security and resisting our efforts to change the institutional problems prevent the ISF from getting better. They will tolerate us as long as they can suckle at Uncle Sam’s bounteous mammary glands. Meanwhile the level of resistance to US freedom of movement and operations will grow. The potential for Iraqi on US violence is high now and will grow by the day. Resentment on both sides will build and reinforce itself until a violent incident break outs into the open. If that were to happen the violence will remain tactically isolated, but it will wreck our strategic relationships and force our withdrawal under very unfavorable circumstances.

Hey, sir, don't beat around the bush, tell us how you really feel. Actually, word on the street from Huggy Bear is that this was an internal memo/assessment that got leaked.

Digital Black Belt...or not

Man, does this new policy mean I can now finally run out an start MyBook and FaceSpace accounts? Cool...

True Friends, Capable Allies

This should be interesting: Colombia has ponied up to assist the US/Coalition effort in Afghanistan. Elements of Colombian SOF will be deployed in support of OEF.
Colombia, as I've stated here before, should be the preeminent model for COIN, and demonstrates what a determined, long-term (and often low profile) US counterinsurgency effort can achieve.

Turn Off the Good Idea Generator

I don't have the time to put on either the Cyprus Hill or RATM version of Pistol Grip Pump, crack my knuckles, and do a detailed takedown of this unsolicited recommendation from MAJ Smiley in the SWJ that Transition Teams need to extend their tours of duty to at/about 24 months. Let's just say that I disagree.
Hey, brother, turn off the good idea generator, euthanize the Good Idea Fairy, and get your head in the game.
Extending tours (or programming longer tours) for combat advisors may, in fact, be a good idea. But the Transition Team program is so rife with problems that the added "goodness" of extended tours is minimal.
Right now, Transition Teams have got bupkiss when it comes to the Army handing them the tools to do their jobs. All a Team has in order to influence its counterpart unit and build operational capacity is looks, brains, and personality. No money, no equipment fielding, no authorities, variable proficiency, and a host of execution problems minimize the effect a Transition Team can have on its counterpart. Fix all those problems, and then perform a detailed analysis on whether TTs are on the ground long enough.
Has it occured to the author that it is the profound lack of lickies & chewies/carrots & sticks that the Transition Team can bring to the fight that retards the growth of interpersonal relationships in the first place? After all, while shared danger on the battlefield goes a long way in US eyes toward building mutual rapport, our counterparts live in a constant state of danger. Being brave enough to share the dangers of the battlefield with one's counterpart, is--in his eyes--kind of an entry level requirement for the job. The first friction a TT leader gets from his counterpart stems from the question: what can you do for me, right now? Because of the dearth of tools at the TTs disposal, this quickly grows into the second, enduring friction point: what have you done for me lately?
From the counterpart's perspective, the TT is a bunch of guys who show up and operate with him--i.e., tell him continually where he's fucking up and what he needs to do better. But, often, we don't have the equipment or funds to escalate the rate of growth of his operational capacity, or even to ameliorate the problems that we continually point out. I will guarantee you that a TT that shows up with the money and equipment to inject a significant jump in operational capacity is going to build a stronger relationship more quickly.
Instead, MAJ Smiley recommends that we take the one asset we have dedicated to the Combat Adivsing dimension of COIN, and break it through over-employment. Instead, the Army needs to perform a no-shit analysis of its perfomance objectives for TTs, and then organize, equip, train, and empower the team to be a nested part of the Coalition campaign. TTs should be able to offer their counterparts more than just time.

What Could Possibly Go Wrong?

This guy should have extra years added to his sentence just for being a dumbass.

Twinkie Time

I'm a big fan of a "body weight" workout paradigm. Move your own weight, through space, in as little time and in as many interesting and varied ways as you can. And I usually think I'm doing well, until I watch someone like this guy. I suck


I'm gonna go eat a twinkie, now.